戰爭與社會：對「二戰結束七十週年」的觀察與反思

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如何紀念「70 週年」？從「三種戰後」談起

2015 年是二戰結束 70 週年，世界各地都舉行了紀念活動。各國紀念的日期與方式不盡相同，背後所代表的意義也很不一樣。在臺灣，存在著至少三種不同的紀念方式，我們或許可以稱之為臺灣的「三個 70 週年」或「三種戰後」。從時間的順序來看，第一個「70 週年」，是由國史館所主辦的「戰爭的歷史與記憶：抗戰勝利 70 週年國際學術討論會」，代表中華民國官方立場的紀念活動，時間是從 7 月 7 日到 7 月 9 日，一連舉行了三天，地點在臺北的圓山大飯店，馬英九總統親自主持開幕儀式，並發表演說。配合這個國際會議，國史館也籌劃了「蔣中正與抗戰：檔案史料特展」，許多珍貴的歷史文件是第一次對外展出。會議結束之後，國史館另外舉辦了「從戰爭到和平──抗戰勝利暨臺灣光復 70 週年紀念特展」，展期從 8 月 15 日到 11 月 28 日。

第二個「70 週年」，是由國立臺灣歷史博物館（臺史博）主辦的「戰爭與臺灣社會」國際學術研討會，時間是從 8 月 15 日進行到 16 日，地點就在臺南的臺史博。同樣地，配合這個紀念活動，臺史博也策劃了一個「戰爭下的臺灣人」特展，規模並不很大，展期從 7 月 21 日到翌年的 2 月 28 日。另外，在 8 月 15 日這天，全臺各地從北到南，都有不同民間團體所發起的紀念活動，

例如臺北228和平紀念公園的「臺灣815終戰和平宣言暨紀念儀式活動」，高雄戰爭與和平紀念公園的「母島的黃昏：815終戰70週年紀念活動」等。事實上，在8月15日之前，臺灣各地就有各種紀念活動，例如由臺灣教授協會所主辦的「臺北大空襲資料特展」與「臺北大空襲70週年座談會」（5月31日）。由於這些活動的紀念性質和8月15日的基本上相同，可以併入第二個70週年來理解。

第三個「70週年」，其實並不發生在臺灣，卻在臺灣社會引發了巨大的爭論。時間是9月3日，北京政府在天安門廣場舉行了規模盛大的「紀念中國人民抗日戰爭暨世界反法西斯戰爭勝利70週年大會」，重頭戲是習近平親臨致詞的閱兵儀式。這件事情之所以在臺灣引起軒然大波，是因為包括國民黨榮譽主席連戰在內的一些臺灣人士，趕赴北京去參加了這場閱兵儀式。同樣地，伴隨這個紀念活動，中國各地相關的紀念館也規劃了特展，例如位於北京盧溝橋的「中國人民抗日戰爭紀念館」的「偉大勝利、歷史貢獻」主題展覽。南京的「侵華日軍南京大屠殺遇難同胞紀念館」的第三期工程新館也在12月7日完工開幕，主題是「正義必勝、和平必勝、人民必勝」，並於12月13日舉行了國家公祭儀式。南京大屠殺雖非70週年，但作為中華民族的苦難象徵，具有高度的指標意義。（註1）

這三個「70週年」，選定的時間、地點、主題與紀念方式都十分不同，背後所代表的意義當然也很不一樣。第一個「70週年」主題是「抗戰勝利70週年」，選在7月7日，象徵的是中華民國政府所領導的七七抗戰，儘管「七七事變」今年並非70週年。第二個「70週年」選在8月15日，是日本天皇宣布投降、結束戰爭的日子。研討會與特展的主題分別是「戰爭與臺灣社會」及「戰爭下的臺灣人」，無關「戰勝」或「戰敗」，主角也不是國家，而是臺灣的社會與人民。第三種「70週年」選定的9月3日是日本簽署降書的翌日，也是中華人民共和國所訂定的「抗日戰爭勝利紀念日」，這次閱兵所紀念的不僅是「中國人民抗日戰爭」的勝利，還有「世界反法西斯戰爭」的勝利。前者凸顯出「人民」的角色，因為抗戰當時的中國政府並非共產黨所領導，而共產黨向來標榜自己才是抗戰的「中流砥柱」。後者則意味著，這場戰爭其實與全世界的反法西斯戰爭有關。這個主題與視角，也是前兩個「70週年」所未見。而以閱兵的形式來紀念勝利，在臺灣更是不可想像。如果我們考慮到兩岸錯綜複雜的歷史關係、中國大陸是影響臺灣未來的重大因素、以及臺灣內部的政治分歧，我們不難理解，為何這場紀念儀式會在臺灣引起那麼大的騷動，甚至連中華民國政府都不得不有所表示，爭取抗戰的話語權。

我們可以很清楚地察覺，這三種70週年不但意義不同，而且彼此是很難相容的。

有些人可能會說，這三種紀念方式，背後反映的是「史觀」的差異，或是「集體記憶」或「歷史記憶」的不同。那麼，我們可以進一步追問：這些不同的「史觀」、「集體記憶」、「歷史記憶」又是如何形成的呢？很多人也許認為，這是因為政治立場或意識形態的差異，導致史觀的不同，因此對戰爭的歷史產生不同的詮釋與記憶；我們應該放下意識形態之爭，追求一個客觀公正的歷史。但事實上，這些史觀或意識形態立場的差異，往往是戰爭本身所創造出來的。我們在批評不同的史觀或意識形態立場之前，不妨先回過頭來想想：戰爭究竟是怎麼一回事？戰爭與我們的關係是什麼？

在下面的討論中，我將從歷史與現實的脈絡抽離出來，從理論的層次思考戰爭與社會的關係，探討背後的普遍原則。我的討論將不是針對「抗戰勝利」，也不是針對「終戰」，甚至不是針對「第二次世界大戰」，而是想藉由這個機會，反思戰爭如何形塑了我們對世界的認知。當我們對背後這些運作機制與普遍原則，有了比較清楚的理解之後，再回過頭來思考現實當中的問題，也許會得到一點啟發。

東亞的戰爭及其遺緒：「社會是戰爭的延續」

環顧四周，當前東亞區域存在的幾個重大問題點，幾乎都與國家的集體暴力極端形式——戰爭或戰爭遺緒（即戰爭所創造或殘留未決的問題）——有關。即以各國內部的基本重大社會分歧來說，臺灣所謂族群、國家認同與統獨問題，說到底，其實是個戰爭遺緒的問題；韓半島的分斷體制與民族主義，是個戰爭遺緒的問題；日本的「新民族主義」、「歷史修正主義」、「和平憲法」與沖繩美軍基地爭議，也是戰爭遺緒的問題；中國內部的「新民族主義」、新疆與西藏問題，不同程度上也是戰爭遺緒的反映。除了內部的社會分歧外，在各國之間存在的重大爭議，也幾乎都和戰爭遺緒有關，包括臺灣海峽的兩岸關係，日韓之間的領土糾紛與仇恨記憶、中日之間有關歷史記憶的爭議（歷史教科書、靖國神社、南京大屠殺等），乃至近年來牽涉中、日、臺三方的釣魚臺諸島紛爭等。這些爭議或問題，究其源頭，無一不指向戰爭，尤其近代（19 世紀以來）發生在這個區域的各個大小戰爭。

以臺灣社會最為切身的統獨問題或國家認同問題為例，其實也是從 19 世紀以來一連串戰爭所遺留下來的後果。如果不考慮鄭成功擊退荷蘭人與施琅攻臺之役，和臺灣歷史地位命運息息相關的戰役就有：中日甲午戰爭、第二次世界大戰、國共內戰、乃至韓戰。這裡面只要有任何一場戰爭的勝負逆轉或是未曾發生，今天的臺灣社會內部的主要分歧（無論是統獨、族群、民族主義、國家認同等），很有可能是完全不同的另外一種樣貌。每一種有關臺灣地位與前途的論述，

幾乎都是在肯定或否定前面戰爭的結果，或對之進行片面的歷史闡釋。不同的政治立場，背後都隱含著對戰爭及其後果的態度與評價，雖然這些態度與評價在大多時候並沒有言明。

過去十多年來，我們觀察到關於戰爭遺緒的研究與討論──如戰爭記憶、戰爭責任、創傷與賠償等問題──大量出現。在大眾文化與媒體，我們也看到以戰爭為背景或題材的文學、報導、戲劇、電影與藝術創作愈來愈多。控訴國家暴力與戰爭傷痕的論述與活動日益頻繁，例如原殖民地出身的日本兵與慰安婦向日本政府要求道歉與賠償。在當前的東亞社會，從臺灣、中國大陸、日本、韓國、沖繩等地，處處可見戰爭所留下來的遺緒與國家暴力的傷跡，人們忙著撫平傷痕、保存記憶、控訴迫害、要求賠償、反抗壓迫。

的確，環繞著戰爭與戰爭遺緒的討論正持續湧現，但除了少數例外，鮮少有人反省戰爭作為集體暴力的本質，或深入探討戰爭對近現代東亞的意義。上面的考察也使我們發現，儘管我們生活在一個看似和平的年代，但無論從時間或空間來看，戰爭離我們其實不遠，我們一直生活在戰爭遺緒當中。歷經兩次世界大戰，當前的世界可說是「戰爭所孕育出來的社會」。我們有必要把戰爭重新帶入思考，當成一個理解現代社會的重要線索來看待。這條線索，可以追溯到克勞塞維茲（Carl von Clausewitz）的經典命題，也就是戰爭與政治之間的關係。

在其經典名著《戰爭論》中，克勞塞維茲提出了如今廣為人知的命題：「戰爭無非是政治以其他手段的延續」。這個命題長久以來影響人們對戰爭的思考：戰爭只是一種手段、一個政策工具，政治才是最後的目的。或許是因為如此，戰爭一直被視為是個暫時的過渡階段，而不是恆常狀態。然而，一個多世紀之後，法國歷史學者傅柯（Michel Foucault）將克勞塞維茲的命題做了 180 度的翻轉，為戰爭與政治的關係開啟了新的詮釋空間。傅柯說：「政治乃戰爭以其他手段的延續。」這番話隱含著「對內」與「對外」兩層解讀的意義，而這兩層意義，都牽涉到現代政治的核心問題。

在對內的層次上，戰爭指的不是主權國家之間的戰爭，而是一種「社會內戰」；這種社會內戰指的也不是實際發生的戰爭，而是指不同個體與群體之間蘊含的內在衝突狀態。換句話說，這裡的戰爭作為一種隱喻被擴大解釋，用來描述權力的運作模式。在此，「政治乃戰爭以其他手段的延續」其實呼應著韋伯（Max Weber）對國家與權力的界定：國家是壟斷合法暴力的政治社群，而權力則是在即使面對抵抗的情況下，也能使他人參與共同行動的實現意志能力。如果我們對照克勞塞維茲把戰爭視為「以暴力迫使敵人屈服於己方的意志」的行為，我們就不難理解為什麼傅柯把政治視為戰爭的延續──戰爭與權力都是要屈服對方的意志，

僅僅是形式不同而已。然而，正是這種混淆了權力與暴力的觀念，引發現代政治的種種問題。政治思想家鄂蘭（Hannah Arendt）在《論暴力》一書中指出，權力指的是人類群體協調行動的能力，是共同生活必然的產物，因此權力並不屬於個人，而屬於群體。權力並不需要被正當化（justified），但需要合法性（legitimacy）。相對地，暴力只有可能是一種工具，使用暴力必須有正當的理由，因此暴力必須被正當化，但暴力毫無合法性可言。對鄂蘭來說，現代政治最根本的謬誤，就反映在韋伯對國家與權力的界定上：暴力不可能是合法的，而權力也不是暴力，並不以屈服別人的意志為行使條件。傅柯把政治視為戰爭的延續，從經驗現實的意義上來說，的確相當精準地捕捉了現代政治的現況；但從規範意義來看，這無疑是現代政治（或者廣義地說，現代性）的問題根源之一，也正是鄂蘭在《論暴力》一書中所大力批判的。

在對外的層次上，我們回到了傳統意義下的戰爭，也就是主權國家之間的戰爭。政治是戰爭的延續，這裡的戰爭不僅僅是個隱喻，而是實實在在發生過的、歷史上的戰爭。如前所述，當今東亞各國內部與外部之間所存在的重大分歧，其實都與 19 世紀以來的各場戰爭有著密不可分的關係。在這個意義下，我們可以說，當前的各國內部（國族）與外部（國際）的政治，都是過去戰爭的延續。臺灣內部的藍綠／族群問題是如此，海峽兩岸的統獨問題是如此，中日、日韓之間的領土爭議與歷史記憶問題，莫不都是過去戰爭「透過其他手段的延續」。更進一步說，由於國家的擴張滲透使得政治權力在現代社會中無所不在，戰爭也就透過政治而變得無所不在。在此情形下，我們想要探討的是：戰爭透過什麼樣的手段、如何被延續？這些延續中的戰爭，對於我們理解當代社會的各種問題與樣態，有何關連或啟發？

民族、國家與戰爭：從「戰爭之框」到「國族之框」

為了探討上述問題，我們必須重新思考戰爭。所謂戰爭，主要指兩個有組織的武裝政治團體（其中一方常為國家）之間的暴力抗爭。在國際法上，主權國家之間的戰鬥行為被視為戰爭，但不是主權國家的交戰團體，通常不被視為戰爭，而被視為叛亂、暴動或內戰。本文對戰爭的界定並不循此。只要兩個武裝團體的暴力抗爭是以政治權力的分配、遂行或爭奪為目的，就可以視為戰爭。因此，臺灣早期漳泉、閩客之間的械鬥不太能算是戰爭，但「霧社事件」可說是個戰爭，1927 年 8 月 1 日發生於南昌的武裝鬥爭（國民黨稱之為「南昌暴動」，共產黨稱之為「南昌起義」）也是戰爭。至於稱之為「事件」、「暴動」還是「起義」，端視詮釋者所仰賴的框架而定，也就是下文將要討論的「戰爭之框」。以武力為手段進行

的革命，也是一種戰爭，因此鄂蘭在《論革命》一書中引用列寧的說法，將革命與戰爭連結起來，有些學者更進一步將俄國與中國的共產革命稱之為「戰爭共產主義」。

作為集體暴力的極端形式，戰爭經常改變既存的社會結構。這些被改變的社會結構，常見的包括領土疆域的變動、統治者的更迭等。戰爭也可能改變統治集團的性質，例如兩次世界大戰，使得大部分的帝國瓦解，蛻變為民族國家。此外，戰爭也會帶來社會人口組成的變化，例如兵燹之災所造成的人口死亡，或是為了逃避戰亂及其所帶來的政權更迭後果，造成人口的大量遷徙。1949 年前後來到臺灣、今天被稱為「外省人」的族群，基本上就是這樣的例子。戰爭也可能因為破壞原有的經濟體制，造成生產力與生產關係的變化。不過，戰爭所改變的諸多社會結構中，有一種在過去比較少受到關注，是本文所欲探討的重點，也就是「認識框架」的變化。我把這種認識框架稱為「戰爭之框」。

所謂「戰爭之框」（frames of war）主要有兩個概念來源，首先是來自知名的美國學者 Judith Bulter 同名之作的啟發。Butler 藉著英語 Frame 的多重意涵，同取其「框架」與「構陷」之意。根據 Butler，「戰爭之框」乃是「選擇性地刻畫作為戰爭行為本質之經驗」的方式，構成了一種感知生命的認識論架構。她以美國在伊拉克戰爭的虐囚照片為例，探討「戰爭之框」如何讓人們區分「可悼念的」（grievable）與「不可（不值得）悼念的」（non-grievable）生命，哪些生命是被認為有價值的，而哪些生命是被刻意忽略、甚至不被認為有資格形成主體的。

「戰爭之框」的第二個概念來源，來自社會學的「框架分析」。美國社會學者 Goffman 將框架界定為「管理社會事件以及我們對其主觀涉入的組織原則」。任何社會中都存在著一些「基本框架」，人們必須透過這些基本框架來認識世界、理解當下；缺乏這些基本框架，世界將變得毫無意義可言。每一個人面對世界紛然雜陳的刺激、現象與事件，必須仰賴一些基本的原則來選取與組織他的經驗，才能產生意義，而這些基本原則就是 Goffman 所稱的認識框架（簡稱「識框」）。識框是建構意義時所依據的要素選取原則，行動者藉此選取原則來界定其所面對的現實。

由此延伸，「戰爭之框」包含兩種意涵，第一種意涵指的是戰爭所創造出來的認識框架，第二種意涵則是指人們藉以界定、理解、詮釋戰爭及其遺緒的認識框架。這兩種意涵是相關的，但內容不完全相同。在第一種意涵中，戰爭作為一種有能力改變社會結構的歷史事件，本身即可能創造出一種新的認知框架，這種認知框架會影響到人們看待自我與世界的方式，當然也包括對戰爭及其遺緒的認知方式。戰爭需要集體動員，「戰爭之框」便是動員與被動員者建構戰爭

意義的主要框架。在現代，戰爭之框經常涉及國族建構，雖然並非所有的國族成員都被動員直接參與戰爭，但「戰爭之框」卻提供了國民全體理解與詮釋戰爭的框架。現代戰爭與前現代的戰爭相較，除了武器因科技與工業化的發展而導致戰爭型態與戰略思維的改變外，另外一個關鍵的不同，在於平民百姓被廣泛地動員涉入戰爭之中，而這個動員過程，其實也就是現代民族國家建構的基礎之一。和國族的建構一樣，戰爭之框也有「從上而下」與「從下而上」的雙向框構過程。在一開始的時候，戰爭之框比較有可能是國家由上而下的建構過程，用意在區辨敵我，動員人力與物力參戰。但隨著戰事的進展與時間的推移，戰爭之框也會不斷被知識分子、文化菁英與一般民眾加強、放大乃至重塑。因此戰爭之框不僅可見於國家的動員文宣與行動，更可見於諸多描述、討論與詮釋戰爭的相關論述與實作裡，諸如文學、戲劇、電影、藝術作品等。

作為一種提供意義與價值的框架，「戰爭之框」首先要劃定界線、區辨敵我。Butler 的「戰爭之框」指的是框架／構陷那些戰地攝影作品的有形／無形的框，而本文的「戰爭之框」指的則是框構戰爭群體內外之別的無形的框，區分了「可悼 vs. 不可悼」、甚至是「值得活 vs. 不值得活」的生命。框外的敵人不是野蠻的匪徒就是邪孽的妖魔，他們不僅是「非我族類」，而且不是「人」，不值得同情憐憫，非僅可殺，而且該殺。消滅這樣的生命不僅不值得惋惜，還要積極參與。抗日戰爭期間中國人管日本人叫「鬼子」，二戰時日本把盟國稱為「鬼畜米英」、盟軍的宣傳也竭力醜化日本，把日本人說成是猴子，這些都是著名的「戰爭之框」把對手「非人化」的例子。

在戰爭之框的內部，則是可悼念的生命。共同的受苦經驗是激發團體凝聚力的最佳秘方，古今中外皆然。法國歷史學者 Ernest Renan 在〈何謂國族〉的知名演說中曾有名言：「共同的苦難比起歡愉更能團結人民。對國族記憶來說，悲憤比勝利更有價值，因為它〔對公民〕施加義務，要求同心協力。」戰禍總是帶來人民的死傷、財產的損失與家園的破壞。戰爭之框一方面要保護框內人民的身家財產安全，一方面要為已經產生的禍害與死傷提出解釋。除了苦難所造成的「受害者」意識外，戰爭還需要英雄、需要鬥士，也需要殉道者（烈士）。戰爭之框要深沉地哀悼苦難死亡，更要激憤昂揚，尋求救贖。因此，戰爭之框不只是一種暫時的「情境定義」而已。作為一種關涉到人的個體生命的終極存在——生與死——以及面對集體暴力的極端形式可能帶來的災害與苦難，戰爭之框必須承載極為沉重的意義，背後或多或少必然隱含一種「神義論」（theodicy），為人們在戰爭中所遭受的不公不義、苦難與傷亡提供最終的補償與救贖。在過去，這種神義論大多由宗教提供；在現代，民族主義成為神義論的主要來源。

正是在這個意義上，民族主義可說是現代社會的宗教。幾乎所有現代民族國家都歷經不同程度的戰爭或集體暴力（如內戰與革命）的洗禮，也都有其哀悼、紀念乃至祭祀的儀式。

戰爭的名稱，也是戰爭之框的反映。同一場戰爭，交戰雙方的命名方式很有可能極為不同。當日本發動的「大東亞戰爭」在戰後被改稱為「太平洋戰爭」時，這個戰爭之框已經改變了。戰爭之框既然提供了人們認識世界的框架，其作用猶如孔恩所稱的「典範」。不同的典範之間可能是「不可共量」的，戰爭之框也是如此。不同的戰爭之框，可以相互連結，但相互敵對的戰爭之框，則往往是不可共量的。戰爭之框與一般所稱的「史觀」不同，在於其所強調的不僅只是一種觀點，而是一種理解世界的基本架構，包含了意義、價值、生死觀等。不同的觀點之間或許可以相互包容，但相互衝突的戰爭之框間卻是不可共量，也難以彼此包容的。

戰爭之框提醒我們，戰爭所帶來的影響不僅是在物質、資源、人力動員等方面，而更在認知與精神層面。這些影響並非暫時的，不會隨著戰事結束而消失；相反地，這些認知與精神層面的影響會因為戰爭之框而持續到戰後，甚至深刻地形塑人們的生命觀與世界觀。戰時「你死我活」的戰爭之框，並不會因為戰爭結束就銷聲匿跡。在民族主義的時代，以民族為名而進行的戰爭，戰爭之框也成了「國族之框」。戰爭之框在戰後經過制度化而成「國族之框」，形成了以國族為中心的世界觀，提供人們一套理解世界、區分自我與他者的框架。在此意義下，國族之框可說是一種戰爭遺緒。即使戰爭結束，關於戰爭的詮釋、戰史的書寫、戰爭的記憶，戰爭之框仍會以國族之框的方式繼續發揮作用。由於現代民族國家的建立過程背後都牽涉到不同程度的戰爭暴力，我們可以說，大部分的民族主義背後都隱含（或至少曾有過）一個或多個戰爭之框。

從「戰爭之框」到「國族之框」，並不是一個自然發生的過程，必須在物資、人力與精神上不斷地動員才有可能達成。戰爭之框不必然只牽涉到某一個特定的戰爭，而會隨著敵人的改變以及外在環境的變化而有所調整，不同的戰爭之框也可能存在聯合放大的效果。但唯一不變的是，戰爭之框必須合理化戰爭及其結果。暴力的結果經常是任意專斷的，但戰爭之框與國族之框卻不接受戰爭及其結果的任意性；相反地，它們拒斥戰爭的任意性，反而想要從國族的歷史敘事賦予這些任意性相應的意義。因此，無論戰勝或戰敗，結果都不是任意的，而必須被戰爭之框與國族之框納入解釋。生命不能無故犧牲，鮮血不能任意白流，民族主義的神義論就在此發揮作用。蒼生不能無端受苦，犧牲必有回報：現在的犧牲是為了後世子孫的幸福，而繼起的國族成員則保證將會永遠紀念那些被犧牲的生命。國族的建構成了救贖的來源，這是為什麼民族主義特別看重新

生、死亡與紀念。

總結來說，戰爭之框不僅區分敵我、鞏固內部，還必須提供救贖，對戰爭的任意性賦予意義，更要合理化暴力的使用。歌頌暴力、表彰烈士英雄、鼓吹犧牲生命，都是戰爭之框所必須樹立的價值觀。自 18 世紀後半以降，以「民族國家」為訴求的國族主義，是戰爭之框的主要基調，這股經過戰爭歷程來建立民族國家的熱潮，在第一次世界大戰前後達於頂峰。二戰之後，歷經了慘絕人寰的大屠殺與前所未有的大規模毀滅浩劫，歐洲各國間力求和解，嘗試以區域整合來超越民族國家，而殖民主義在亞非各地節節敗退，戰爭之框也不再以國族主義為基調。冷戰時期，是以「共產集團」對上「自由民主陣營」為主要的框架，而在冷戰結束後，強調的則是人道主義與所謂「普世價值」（如自由、民主、人權、反恐、人道救援等）。在東亞，以國族主義為基調的戰爭之框，仍主宰著這個地區的人們對過去的記憶、對現在的認識、以及對未來的想像。因為戰爭之框的衝突而形成「歷史認識問題」，造成「東亞重層的怨恨結構」，可說是當今東亞局勢充滿潛在衝突與緊張的根源之一。（註2）

回到臺灣的歷史脈絡來看，臺灣的戰爭之框，情況又遠比東亞近鄰的日本及中國大陸都要來得複雜許多。近現代史中的臺灣，鮮少以自身（即這塊土地及居住其上的人民）為主體從事過戰爭，少數稱得上的例外大概是 1895 年臺灣民主國曇花一現的抗日戰爭，以及日本殖民統治臺灣初期遍布各地、規模不一的武裝抗日行動，其中最具知名度的，又以 1930 年的霧社事件為代表。臺灣民主國奉大清為正朔，大致上可視為甲午戰爭的延續；霧社事件則是一個前現代的部落社會對抗現代殖民國家的戰爭，由於武力懸殊，最終以悲劇收場。霧社事件之後，臺灣再也沒有出現過具規模的武裝抗日行動，而隨著日本發動侵華戰爭與東亞擴張，臺灣反被捲入日本帝國的戰爭之框，在皇民化運動時期達於高潮。二戰之後，臺灣重新被劃入中國版圖，框外的敵人變成了框內的祖國，這個識框的轉換並不容易，過程也極不平順。1947 年爆發的 228 事件，對於某些參與者與觀察者來說，毋寧是另一場「對抗外來統治者」的戰爭。1949 年，在國共內戰失利的國民黨政權遷臺，從此臺灣又被納入一個國共內戰的戰爭之框，與共黨政權隔海對峙。這個戰爭之框對臺灣政治、社會乃至經濟與文化各方面的發展，直到今天都具有巨大而深遠的影響。

從上面的簡要勾勒可以看出，儘管臺灣本土並未歷經大規模的主權戰爭，但臺灣的近現代史一直不乏戰爭的陰影與影響。19 世紀以來一連串戰爭導致版圖重劃與政權轉移，使得臺灣也在不同的戰爭之框中被劃來劃去，一下子在框內、一下子在框外，而不同的戰爭之框之間，有的彼此敵對，有的則相互轉化變形。簡要地說，我們大致可

以在當代的臺灣，發現幾個不同的戰爭之框：一個是破碎變形的「大東亞戰爭／太平洋戰爭」之框，一個是「抗日戰爭」之框，另一個則是「國共內戰」之框。前兩者很大程度上決定了「本省族群」與「外省族群」的集體記憶之不同，而後者則是影響著兩岸關係的基本框架。這些戰爭之框彼此之間存在矛盾，卻又相互生成轉化，以致造成許多矛盾或弔詭的現象。時至今日，我們仍然聽到許多人在公開或私下場合指責別人是「皇民」、「漢奸」，或是把不同政治立場的人說成是「賣臺」、「叛國」，基本上都是這些不同的「戰爭之框」在起著「劃分敵我」的作用。臺灣的主體意識，本身就是一種戰爭遺緒，是多重戰爭之後所創造出來的產物。

如果我們理解到這一點，那麼重新回頭來看現在臺灣社會的許多關鍵爭議，其實都可以說是「戰爭的延續」。統獨的爭議，藍綠的爭議，甚至歷史課綱的爭議，都是近代以來幾場重大戰爭的延續。也許有人會說，把這些事情說成是戰爭的延續，並沒有解決任何問題。對於想要「解決問題」的人來說，必須堅持自己的信念立場，戰鬥到底，直到戰勝另一方為止。然而，除了訴諸戰爭（無論是實質的或隱喻的戰爭）來解決問題外，另一種可能的方式是「解消問題」，讓問題不再存在，或是轉化問題，讓問題變得比較容易解決。如果社會是戰爭的延續，那麼我們是否還要繼續從事這場戰爭？如何讓戰爭可以不再延續？這是我們可以嘗試去思考的方向。

結語：超越「戰爭之框」

總結來說，戰爭與戰爭遺緒對社會生活的影響，除了表現在政治體制、統治技藝、生產消費、社會制度、身體規訓以外，還有一部分在於戰爭所創造出的識框。戰爭裡有太多生離死別的感人故事，有人性的扭曲，有命運的捉弄擺布，有捨己為群、犧牲奉獻、捨生取義的高尚情操，還有慘絕人寰的凌虐殺戮，以及多不勝數、無情殘酷的悲慘遭遇。如果不去探究戰爭之框及其背後的作用與意涵，我們很容易深陷在記憶的泥淖裡，在紛亂複雜的細節中迷失，甚至流於表面浮淺的描述、感慨與喟嘆。面對形形色色的戰爭之框保持清醒與警覺，是我們處理戰爭與戰爭遺緒時最基本也最重要的態度。

戰爭之框也幫助我們理解，人與人之間為何無法和解、甚至要相互殘殺。不去追究戰爭之框的形成，無法從根化解紛爭、達致和解。戰爭與國家暴力所造成的苦難與傷痛，其實是類似的，不同群體間的苦難經驗，也有很多可以相通之處。然而，戰爭之框卻隔離了不同的群體，阻斷了彼此的感知與體驗交流。框內與框外難以相互理解，兩個敵對的戰爭之框尤其如此，彼此不可共量。現代性強調人的平等與尊嚴，戰爭之框卻讓人的生命不再平等、也失去尊嚴。有些

人的生命比起另外一些人更有價值，有些生命的失去是「可悼念的」，而另外一些生命的失去則是「不可悼念的」。用克勞塞維茲的話來說，戰爭以屈服敵人的意志為目的，因此戰爭之框的存在，不僅妨礙了彼此的理解，也阻斷了溝通與對話的可能。

本文並不是要強調戰爭之框的牢不可破與無所不在；恰恰相反，戰爭之框能夠藉由不斷地反思而被超越。近年來的許多研究與事例也顯示，許多戰爭的記憶與敘事逸出標準的戰爭之框。然而，我們也不應忘記，戰爭之框依舊牢固而深遠地影響著許多人對這個世界的過去、現在與未來的看法。戰爭之框的作用，讓人們不自覺地活在「戰爭狀態」中。在這個看似和平的年代，戰爭其實離我們不遠；戰爭的遺緒，透過戰爭之框，繼續影響著人們看待世界、界定問題的方式。戰爭之框幫助人們認識世界、詮釋民族的過去與未來，但也加諸許多限制，使得不同框架的人們難以相互溝通理解。（註3）當前東亞各國的民族主義情緒高漲，但僅僅是喊出「和平」或「和解」的口號，恐怕效果有限。最重要的是，身處其中的人們有必要在不同識框之間轉換，進而超越這些戰爭之框。二戰結束已經 70 週年，如何讓過去的戰爭不再延續，是值得我們共同思考的課題。

延伸閱讀：

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【註釋】

1. 值得留意的是，第一次國家公祭是在 2014 年 12 月 13 日舉行，習近平親自出席並發表談話，可說是為 2015 年的 70 週年紀念活動揭開序幕。這也是 1949 年中華人民共和國成立以來，官方舉辦的第一個國家公祭。
2. 關於「東亞重層的怨恨結構」，請參見筆者的其他論文：〈從《戰爭論》到《新歷史教科書》：試論日本當代民族主義的怨恨心態及其制度成因〉，《臺灣社會學》，第 19 期（2010 年 6 月），頁 147-202；以及〈淺論兩岸國族問題中的情感結構：一種對話的嘗試〉，收入徐斯儉、曾國祥編，《文明的呼喚：尋找兩岸和平之路》（新北：左岸文化，2012 年），頁 181-231。
3. 這種溝通理解的障礙，不僅出現在政治場域，也出現在文化場域。例如前幾年引發話題的電影《賽德克巴萊》，雖然同樣是「抗日」，但在中國大陸上映時反應不如預期、甚至招致批評，因為觀眾們透過習以為常的戰爭之框，在電影中看不到抗日戰爭所應該有的「民族大義」。

The Showa Hall: Memorializing Japan's War at Home

Kerry Smith

The Public Historian, Vol. 24, No. 4. (Autumn, 2002), pp. 35-64.

Stable URL:
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The Shôwa Hall: Memorializing Japan's War at Home

KERRY SMITH

Introduction

By the late 1990s, more than one hundred museums and exhibition sites in Japan reflected on the experiences of wartime, defeat, and the quest for world peace. Some of these sites are long-standing. The Yûshûkan at Yasukuni Shrine has preserved and displayed articles associated with the war dead since 1882, which makes it one of Japan's oldest museums of any kind.[1] Both the Hiroshima Peace Museum and the Nagasaki Atomic Bomb Museum opened their doors to the public in early 1955, shortly after the end of the American Occupation and the censorship that came with it, and thus

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Portions of this essay were originally published on the "H-Asia" Internet discussion list (*H-Asia@h-net.msu.edu*) on 13 April 1999. Laura Hein, Thomas Havens, Sandra Wilson, and colleagues in the Brown University Department of History are among those who offered useful suggestions on revisions. Yuko Kawato assisted in the research.

1. Ajia ni Taisuru Nihon no Sensô Sekinin o Tô Minshû Hôtei Junbikai, "Kokunai no 'rekishi kinenkan' annai," *Sensô Sekinin* 1 (1994): 75.

The Public Historian, Vol. 24, No. 4, pp. 35–64 (Fall 2002). ISSN: 0272-3433
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have already been the destination of several generations of school children and tourists. Three years after Okinawa's 1972 reversion to Japanese government control, the Okinawa Prefectural Peace Museum began offering detailed exhibitions of the war's effects on local communities and inhabitants. That same year, visitors were invited to stop by the Chiran Special Attack Forces Peace Exhibition Hall (Chiran Tokkô Heiwa Kaikan), constructed on the grounds of a Kagoshima airbase from which young pilots left on one-way missions in the closing months of the war, to learn more about the lives and deaths of Japan's kamikaze pilots.[2]

More recent developments in the memorialization of the war have had less to do with specific sites and the events associated with them.[3] Since the early 1990s, local governments, semi-public institutions and private individuals throughout Japan have initiated a boom of sorts in the planning and construction of "peace" museums. The Osaka International Peace Center (Kokusai Heiwa Sentaa), also known as "Peace Osaka," opened in July 1991 under the joint administration of the Osaka municipal and prefectural governments. Over the next few years, similarly focused facilities were completed in Kawasaki, Kyoto, Nagasaki, and Saitama, even as a number of other localities announced plans to develop their own peace museums and exhibition sites. These facilities speak less to a single moment in the nation's history, or to the war's effects on a single community, and try instead to encompass a broader narrative about the war's causes and effects. Many are explicitly and powerfully critical of Japan's actions during the war, and engage visitors in a thoughtful dialogue about those actions and their legacies.[4] No one museum, and no one point of view, has a monopoly on how the war years will be remembered. It is important to point this out, and not lose sight of the fact that contemporary Japan offers multiple perspectives on the recent past.

2. See Ian Buruma, *The Wages of Guilt: Memories of War in Germany and Japan*, 1st ed. (New York: Farrar, Straus, and Giroux, 1994), 225–32, and Stephen Mansfield, "Among the Ghosts of the Kamikaze," *Japan Times*, 23 August 2000. Norma Field describes her visits to Okinawa memory sites in Norma Field, *In the Realm of a Dying Emperor* (New York: Vintage, 1993).

3. Yamabe Masahiko, "Nihon no heiwa hakubutsukan no tôtatsuten to kadai," in Rekishi Kyôikusha Kyôgikai (Ed.), *Heiwa hakubutsukan, sensô shiryôkan gaidobukku* (Tokyo: Aoki Shoten, 2000), 252. There are important exceptions to this rule. The Cornerstone of Peace (Heiwa no Ishii), located in Mabuni, Itoman City, Okinawa, is linked geographically to the Battle of Okinawa, and in the timing of its opening to the fiftieth anniversary of the end of that battle. See Gerald Figal, "Historical Sense and Commemorative Sensibility at Okinawa's Cornerstone of Peace," *positions* 5 (Winter 1997): 745–78 for an insightful analysis of the memorial and its meanings.

4. The Saitama Prefecture Heiwa Shiryôkan opened in August 1993, Kawasaki City's Heiwakan on 15 April 1992, Ritsumeikan University's Kokusai Heiwa Museum in May 1992, and the Oka Masaharu Peace Memorial Hall in 1995. "Kako no shinryaku mo misue," *Asahi shinbun*, 25 October 1993; Ajia ni Taisuru Nihon no Sensô Sekinin o Tô Minshû Hôtei Junbikai, "Kokunai no 'rekishi kinenkan' annai," 75. Kanagawa prefecture, Itan City in Hyōgo, and Tokyo were among those announcing museum or exhibition site construction projects. Kyôgikai, *Heiwa hakubutsukan, sensô shiryôkan gaidobukku* lists 113 sites in 32 prefectures. English-language press coverage of these sites and the perspectives they reflect has been minimal, to say the least.

The 1999 opening in Tokyo of the Shôwa-kan, or Shôwa Hall (named after the era of Emperor Hirohito's reign, which began in 1926 and ended with his death in 1989), is thus one of several such recent events, and the facility itself one of the many places that school groups, tourists, and the nostalgic will visit in search of contact with the war years. At the same time, however, the Hall occupies an unusual place in the public history of the nation's crises of the 1930s and 1940s. The complicated and ongoing negotiations over how to remember the key events of those years, why, and for whom, have been played out in a number of venues in postwar Japan, but they are especially well illuminated in the Shôwa Hall's own history.[5] In the debates over its institutional configuration, its mission, the exhibitions it would house, and even its location, the story of how the Hall came to take its present shape reveals a great deal about the trajectory of the war's meaning in the 1990s and beyond. Those debates and their outcomes are woven into the Hall's history and mapped onto its final form, so that the facility is as much a subject of study as the narratives it seeks to convey.

The Hall's significance as a "memory site" owes something to its sponsorship. The Hall represents the national government's first foray into the semi-permanent memorialization of the war. The museums in Hiroshima, Nagasaki, and elsewhere that examine the wartime experiences are locally run and supported; they can speak for a narrower constituency. The Yûshûkan is a private facility, as is the Yasukuni Shrine which administers it. The Shôwa Hall, in contrast, was built and continues to be funded by the central government. Even if the Hall does not claim to speak for or to the entire nation, its origin as a national and not private or local project privileges its position alongside other museums and memorials.

So does its location. At the risk of stating the obvious, that the Hall is in the nation's capital and not somewhere else has both practical and symbolic

5. See Ellen H. Hammond, "Commemoration Controversies: The War, the Peace, and Democracy in Japan," in Laura Elizabeth Hein and Mark Selden (Eds.), *Living With the Bomb: American and Japanese Cultural Conflicts in the Nuclear Age* (Armonk, N.Y.: M. E. Sharpe, 1997), 100–21 for a detailed, insightful history of the processes that shaped the Shôwa Hall's development. Recent analyses of the Shôwa Hall, memory and politics include Takashi Yoshida, "Disputes Over Showakan Museum in Japan: Whom Should We Remember, Asian Victims or Japanese Patriots?" (paper presented at the Association for Asian Studies Annual Meeting, Chicago, 23 March 2001); Franziska Seraphim, "The Showa Hall and Conservative Reactionism in Contemporary Japan" (paper presented at the Association for Asian Studies Annual Meeting, Chicago, 24 March 2001); and Franziska Seraphim, "Negotiating the Post-war: Politics and War Memory in Japan, 1945–1995" (Ph.D. diss., Columbia University, 2001). For works that deal directly with the war's legacies and meaning in postwar Asia and Japan, see John W. Dower, "An Aptitude for Being Unloved: War and Memory in Japan," in Omer Bartov, Atina Grossmann, and Mary Nolan (Eds.), *Crimes of War: Guilt and Denial in the Twentieth Century* (New York: The New Press, 2002), 217–41, 313–21; Takashi Fujitani, Geoffrey M. White, and Lisa Yoneyama (Eds.), *Perilous Memories: The Asia-Pacific War(s)* (Durham, N.C.: Duke University Press, 2001), Yoshikuni Igarashi, *Bodies of Memory: Narratives of War in Postwar Japanese Culture, 1945–1970* (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 2000) and James Joseph Orr, *The Victim as Hero: Ideologies of Peace and National Identity in Postwar Japan* (Honolulu: University of Hawai'i Press, 2001).

implications. The Hall sits just outside the northern entrance to the Kitanomaru Park, until 1969 part of the Imperial grounds and at present home of the Nippon Budôkan sports complex, the National Museum of Modern Art, and several other public facilities. The Hall's Chiyoda Ward address situates it close to Tokyo's centers of political and symbolic power; the Diet, the Supreme Court, most ministries, and of course the Imperial Palace all lie within the ward's boundaries. Though other museums and memorial sites in Tokyo deal in some way with the war years, only two are quite so centrally located. One is the Hall, and the other is the Yûshûkan, the Yasukuni Shrine's museum. The long, wide pedestrian boulevard leading up to the shrine's main precincts begins almost right across the street from the Shôwa Hall, so that the walk from one to the other is a matter of only a few minutes. Because the shrine, and to a lesser extent the Yûshûkan have figured prominently in debates about how the war might be remembered in contemporary Japan, in ways that will be discussed in more detail below, their proximity to the Shôwa Hall creates a complicated, problematic set of overlapping narratives about the war and its legacy and meanings.[6]

The Shôwa Hall's place in modern Japan is further complicated by the process that produced it.[7] The impetus for its construction originated within the Nihon Izokukai, or Japan Association of Bereaved Families, a large, politically well-connected group used to lobbying the state on behalf of the financial interests of children and family members of soldiers lost in the war. The Izokukai had by the 1980s expanded its focus to encompass more than just the material well-being of its constituency, and was instrumental in convincing the government to fund a national memorial to the Japanese war dead and their families. Izokukai officials participated in the planning, design, and content development of the facility that would eventually become the Shôwa Hall. Opposition to the closed and sometimes secretive planning process was intense, and its presence points to another unusual aspect of the museum's development. Sharp criticism from both the right and the left played an important role in a drawn-out story of abandoned designs, a narrowing of narrative focus, and a gradual elimination of anything about the museum's content that might provoke controversy. In the end, the Hall was certainly not what the Izokukai had said it wanted, but that it was built at all is a seminal event in the history of modern Japan's construction of its past.

6. It might also be worth pointing out that the Hall is thus relatively distant from what might be described as the key alternative, or even oppositional, memorial and museum sites. Hiroshima, Nagasaki, and Okinawa evoke the destructive legacies of the war for many Japanese in ways that other sites cannot. The newer peace museums in Kyoto and Osaka are similarly removed from the nation's political and administrative centers of power.

7. The process and the problems associated with it are hardly unique to Japan. As Arjun Appadurai and Carol A. Breckenridge observe about the process of memorialization in India, "Today, museums reflect complex mixtures of state and private motivation and patronage, and tricky transnational problems of ownership, identity, and the politics of heritage." Arjun Appadurai and Carol A. Breckenridge, "Museums are Good to Think: Heritage on View in India," in Ivan Karp, Christine Mullen Kreamer, and Steven D. Lavine (Eds.), *Museums and Communities: The Politics of Public Culture* (Washington, D.C.: Smithsonian Institution Press, 1992), 44.

The timing and thus the context of the Hall's opening are significant as well. The early 1990s rush to complete museums of peace certainly owed something to the fiftieth anniversary of the end of the Second World War and a collective desire to mark that occasion. (The Shôwa Hall's planners were among those who wished to open their facility in 1995 precisely for that reason.) One could argue too that the end of the Cold War signaled another turning point, one that helped bring the war's legacies into closer focus. The most unmistakable marker that the nation had reached the end of an era, however, was the death in 1989 of the Shôwa Emperor, whose reign encompassed not only the war years but the remarkable recovery which followed. Shielded by American officials from prosecution as a war criminal during the Allied Occupation of Japan (1945–52), the Shôwa Emperor never publicly addressed questions of responsibility for the war. Quite the contrary—his long silence on matters relating to the war and defeat had a chilling effect on open, sustained debates on those topics. Hirohito's death thus seemed to allow if not require a wider variety of discussions of the wartime past than had ever been possible before 1990.[8] The language that surfaced most often in public discussions of the origins of these new museums, for example, called attention to the passing of the generation that had lived through the war years (of which Hirohito was arguably the most visible symbol), and to the arrival of an era in which fewer and fewer Japanese possessed first-hand knowledge of that period in Japan's modern history. The emperor's death, in other words, marks the beginning of new opportunities to speak out, and serves as a not too subtle reminder of the perils of not speaking out soon enough. The Shôwa Hall is among those museums offering to provide a place to preserve the artifacts and, at some level, the memories of the war years. Many of these newer museums (often in collaboration with civic groups) have mounted successful campaigns urging elderly citizens and their families to consider donating items of historical value "before it is too late." Although there are few guarantees that donated items will become part of an exhibit, the offer to preserve and store objects that might otherwise be lost has an obvious and multi-layered appeal.

Issues of timing and public memory have intersected with the Hall in at least one other way. Questions about the museum's content and limitations were paralleled by broader debates over how the war should be remembered, and taught. By broader I mean that the debates are no longer as likely to be located in academia and played out in scholarly journals. Kobayashi Yoshinori's best-selling 1998 illustrated "novel" *Sensôron* (On War) for example, portrays a nation weakened by constant apology and an inability to take pride in Japan's wartime accomplishments.[9] Tōei's 1998 film *Pride: The Fateful Moment* offered a sympathetic portrayal of Tôjô Hideki while

8. For more on the impact of Hirohito's death on public discussions of the war, see Dower, "An Aptitude for Being Unloved," 232–34; Field, *In the Realm of a Dying Emperor;* Carol Gluck, "The Past in the Present," in Andrew Gordon (Ed.), *Postwar Japan as History* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1993), 64–95.

9. Kobayashi Yoshinori, *Sensôron* (Tokyo: Gentōsha, 1998).

casting the nation's war aims, and its achievements, in positive terms. Like *Sensôron*, works like *Pride* (and more recently, *Merdeka*) have found enthusiastic domestic audiences.[10] Although it would not be difficult to find scattered examples in film or print of similar themes surfacing well before 1998, there is clearly something different about the frequency and power of such themes in the popular culture of the 1990s.

Much of the responsibility for this end-of-the-century effort to ennoble the war and those who fought in it lies with the Society for the Making of New School Textbooks in History (Atarashii Rekishi Kyôkasho o Tsukuru Kai), and groups like it. Together these neo-revisionists have developed a visible and well-funded public presence, demanding a wholesale re-evaluation of what they describe as the nation's masochistic approach to its own history.[11] Authors associated with the Society have produced a body of work that tries to convince readers that the "correct" history is one that celebrates Japan's achievements rather than agonizing over the past. In Japan's current political and economic climate, such challenges to the status quo have attracted a great deal of attention, not all of it critical. While it is often the neo-revisionists' demands that the Nanjing massacre and the existence of institutionalized sexual slavery not be presented as historical fact that gets them into the news, their agenda is at times much subtler than such grandstanding would suggest. Their willingness to co-opt the past in order to foster patriotism and a more robust sense of citizenry is nothing new, in Japan or in any other modern nation. But as Laura Hein has argued, the visibility and volume of this discourse at the end of the century reflects the extent to which both Japan's past and future seem to be up for grabs. And that is new.[12]

"Memory is never shaped in a vacuum," observes James Young; "the motives of memory are never pure."[13] This essay explores some of the tensions between history, memory, and the war's meanings in contemporary Japan, through the lens of the Shôwa Hall. These tensions take at least two forms. First and perhaps most obvious are questions of how remembering (or forgetting) the war experiences shapes Japan's relationships with other states, and with its immediate neighbors in particular. In South Korea and

10. *Merdeka (Freedom)* purports to tell the story of the heroic contributions of several thousand Japanese soldiers to the post–World War II Indonesian independence movement. For a review, see Mark Schilling, "Merdeka," *Japan Times*, 2 May 2001.

11. Gavan McCormack, "The Japanese Movement to 'Correct' History," in Laura Hein and Mark Selden (Eds.), *Censoring History: Citizenship and Memory in Japan, Germany, and the United States* (Armonk, N.Y.: M. E. Sharpe, 2000), 53–73. Nishio Kanji's *Atarashii rekishi kyôkasho* was published in June 2001. The society lobbied hard for its adoption in schools across the country, with only limited success. Nishio Kanji, *Atarashii rekishi kyôkasho* (Tokyo: Fusōsha, 2001).

12. Laura Hein and Mark Selden, "The Lessons of War, Global Power, and Social Change," in Hein and Selden (Eds.), *Censoring History*, 20–21.

13. James Edward Young, *The Texture of Memory: Holocaust Memorials and Meaning* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1993), 2.

China, for example, the public's willingness to engage Japan as a trading and security partner has been constrained by collectively held opinions about Japan's unwillingness fully to confront its past. Whether in the form of insensitive and inexplicable comments by government officials that seem to downplay or deny responsibility for the war and for atrocities committed by Japanese troops during the conflict, or in textbook passages that do much the same, official Japan's postwar public handling of the war includes enough such moments to present a pattern of denial and willful forgetting to critical observers. The region's security and trade relationships have almost certainly suffered as a result. The regular recurrence of damaging remarks and unapologetic comments in Japan's public spaces and media has helped rekindle anger in Korea and China over the war's atrocities, even as they raise questions about Japan's commitment to pacifism and cooperation. The nation's failure to reflect on its actions and express sufficient remorse for them, some would argue, increases the odds that Japan could once again seek to exploit its neighbors. How Japan's actions in Asia are dealt with is thus an important and closely watched element in any public history of the war years.

A second and related tension rises out of the uses to which histories of the war years are put in constructing narratives for domestic consumption. These can take many forms, but of particular interest here are the explicit and implicit ways in which themes of sacrifice, struggle, suffering, and citizenship are used to connect the exhibited history of the war years with the present day. As much as the Shôwa Hall is about the 1930s and 1940s in Japan, it clearly has something to say about contemporary Japan, and to contemporary Japanese, as well. The Hall's mission statement is quite clear on this point; reflecting on the past, the facility's planners argue, is very much about taking stock of the present, and looking ahead to the future. Teasing out what those messages about the past and present might be at this particular moment in Japan's modern history is the central project of this essay.

Planning

Twenty years passed between the first proposals for the construction of a memorial facility and the completion of the Shôwa Hall in 1999. The planning process that culminated in the Hall's opening was largely hidden from public view, confined as it was to a series of committees and consultative bodies answering only to the Ministry of Health and Welfare, whose responsibility it was to address the needs of veterans of the war, and the families of the war dead. The process became only somewhat more transparent in late 1992, when the Ministry first included a report describing the new facility in documents it submitted to the Diet. That step made public one version of plans for the museum, but neither the Ministry of Health and

Welfare nor the other groups involved proved particularly open to feedback on any aspect of that or subsequent proposals. As a result, even after 1992 decisions about the museum's design, location, and focus were made without significant, formal mechanisms for input from parties not already at the planning table.

The list of those who did participate in defining the museum's purpose and design is at first glance surprisingly wide ranging. Included were representatives of each of Japan's major daily newspapers, executives from the corporate and nonprofit sectors, academics, an architect, a graphic designer, and at least one library specialist, to name but a few of the members of the half dozen committees that helped design and define the new facility.[14] Their contributions to the museum, however, are clearly less significant individually (and probably collectively) than those of the Japan Association of Bereaved Families.

The Association of Bereaved Families, or Nihon Izokukai, has been the most visible advocate for the construction, at government expense, of a facility to honor and memorialize Japan's war dead and their families. The Association got its start in the immediate aftermath of Japan's defeat lobbying the postwar government to provide aid to the families of those killed in the war. In the years since it has become an outspoken and politically formidable interest group, one with close ties to the Liberal Democratic Party and key ministries. As part of that process, the Association has expanded the scope of its activism to include not only the maintenance of material benefits for survivors, but questions of how contemporary Japan remembers and honors the war dead, the orphaned, and the bereaved, as well.[15] Prime Minister Yasuhiro Nakasone's official visit to Yasukuni Shrine in 1982 owes something to the Association's years of lobbying efforts in support of closer ties between the state and the shrine, for example, and the almost vitriolic reaction of Association spokesmen to Prime Minister Hosokawa Morihiro's 1993 categorization of the Pacific War as one of aggression speaks similarly to their ongoing efforts to protect the past from the present. The Association's 1979 proposal to the government and Liberal Democratic Party that the state construct a public exhibition hall to honor the war dead and their families is thus very much in keeping with the group's understanding of its mission and responsibilities. Its close ties with government officials and its long working relationship with the Ministry of Health and Welfare meant that the Association would remain at the center of the planning process.

The Izokukai's intent is not hard to fathom. In its initial 1979 appeal, the Association's argument was that "those orphans whose fathers were sacrificed for the nation have come this far through very trying circumstances,

14. See Tanaka Nobumasa, "Keishô sarenai rekishi," *Sensô Sekinin* 1 (January, 1994): 15 and 28, for lists of committee members.

15. Hammond, "Commemoration Controversies," 104–7.

without a single national institution [to support them]. Given that, the state should perform some act of consolation on their behalf."[16] In 1993 Association Vice President Suehiro Sakae reiterated the group's assertion that the role of the facility would be "to provide some vindication to those children who want to know that their father's blood was not spilled in vain. We should show the role the Japanese military played in a broader historical sense, and provide a correct history. The Japanese military, one could argue, aided in the independence of Southeast Asia."[17] "That war," as Suehiro later said, "was a Greater East Asia War, not a Pacific War. We fought to liberate Asia. Economically isolated, Japan had no choice but to fight."[18] Though even the youngest of those who lost family members in the war were already middle-aged when the Izokukai first articulated its plans for a memorial hall, Association spokesmen never wavered from their assertion that memorialization and instruction in the "correct history" of the war went hand in hand. As the number of those able to put a positive spin on Japan's wartime deeds on the basis of their own lived experiences grew fewer and fewer, the Association worked to carve out a space in which those memories would be rearticulated and preserved.

They succeeded, although the final product was not all that Association members had hoped for. As clear as the Association spokesmen were about what they wanted, the planning process turned out to be anything but straightforward. In the two decades it took to complete planning and construction, the half-dozen committees assigned to oversee those tasks assigned a new name to the site on five separate occasions, abandoned or significantly altered designs for the museum twice, and redefined the Hall's subject matter at least three times. In 1984 committee members unveiled the first concrete plans for a facility, a massive Peace Prayer Comprehensive Center (Heiwa Kinen Sôgô Sentaa). At almost 200,000 square meters, the Center would have occupied an area considerably larger than Hibiya Park. The grounds of the proposed Center would have featured guest lodging, archives, a parking lot, and several exhibition areas. The latter were clearly intended to be the highlight of any visitor's experience. The exhibitions as imagined by the committee included displays of weaponry and uniforms, dioramas of important battles, and other references to Japan's modern military campaigns and their impact on the home front. Japan's war casualties were not forgotten. The walls of the exhibition space, the committee's report noted, would be inscribed with the names of the dead.[19]

16. Tanaka Nobumasa, "Keishô sarenai rekishi," 14.
17. "Sensô o dô nokosu ka," *Mainichi shinbun*, 12 July 1993.
18. "Yureru 'Senbotsusha Tsuitô Heiwa Kinenkan,'" *Sankei shinbun*, 16 November 1994.
19. Japan lost more than 100,000 soldiers and sailors in the Sino-Japanese (1894–1895) and Russo-Japanese (1904–1905) wars, and more than three million civilians and service personnel in the Second World War. It is not clear how planners hoped to document, or present, such a list. Tanaka Nobumasa, "Keishô sarenai rekishi," 16.

A lack of consensus within the original committee and reluctance on the part of the Ministry of Health and Welfare to embrace this particular approach to memorialization led to the formation of a series of new committees and consultative bodies. The first took shape in 1985. With a new membership and a more narrowly defined charge, the group was to consider not such a comprehensive memorial site, but one that addressed the particular needs of the children of the war dead.[20] In an interim report in 1987, and again in a more fully developed document produced in 1992, committee members described in detail their plans for the construction of the new facility. Though initially called the War Bereaved Children's Memorial Hall, a name that clearly reflected the Izokukai's original intent for the site, the Ministry of Health and Welfare quietly dropped that title and substituted a new one, the War Dead Peace Memorial Hall (Senbotsusha Tsuitô Heiwa Kinen-kan).[21] It was at about this point in late 1992 that the Ministry's construction plans surfaced in the Diet, and soon afterwards in the mainstream press.

Plans for the War Dead Peace Memorial Hall combined a limited research and archival function with three (in some reports, four) floors of exhibition space. The displays and interpretive materials in that space focused almost entirely on the context and conflicts of the 1930s and 1940s; modern Japan's earlier military actions were not discussed. Similarly, the brief descriptions included in the 1992 and 1993 plans left little doubt that the exhibits described the war's hardships only to the extent that Japanese participants had experienced them. As a Ministry of Health and Welfare official noted, the Hall sought to evoke "the wretchedness of war, from the point of the view of the lives of [Japan's] citizens." While at least some of Japan's citizens would have described non-Japanese as having had some wretched experiences too, the Hall's interpretive focus was confined to Japanese suffering.[22]

Just how limited its perspective would be was clarified in other ways as well. Planners noted that one of the War Dead Peace Memorial Hall's major goals was to acknowledge "the loss of some three million lives" during the war. As critics and Diet politicians were quick to point out, the "three million lives" figure corresponds almost perfectly to the Ministry of Health and Welfare's current estimate of Japanese losses at home and abroad over the

20. Tanaka Nobumasa, "Keishô sarenai rekishi," 16–17.

21. Hammond, "Commemoration Controversies," 103. The name change likely reflects the Ministry's desire to expand the scope of the museum's focus beyond the orphaned to include the public at large. See also Tanaka Nobumasa, "Keishô sarenai rekishi," 22.

22. Arai Shinichi, "'Senbotsusha Tsuitô Heiwa Kinenkan' o tô," in Arai Shinichi (Ed.), *Sensô hakubutsukan* (Tokyo: Iwanami Shoten, 1994). This phenomenon is hardly confined to Japan, or to the Pacific War. As Sybil Milton noted in regard to Holocaust memorials in general, there is "a universal willingness to commemorate suffering experienced rather than suffering caused." Quoted in Susan A. Crane, "Memory, Distortion, and History in the Museum," *History & Theory* 36 (1997): 27.

course of the war.[23] In other words, the Hall would have nothing to say about the casualties, hardship, and suffering experienced by anyone other than the Japanese. The geographic constraints on coverage were similarly severe. Although designers included a very small section on China and Southeast Asia under Japanese control in early descriptions of the proposed exhibits, for example, the Hall would neither attempt to describe the war's effects outside of Japan nor discuss Japan's responsibility toward any of the nations ravaged by the war. Exhibit space featured instead such topics as the daily life of people during the war, daily life during the occupation, and hardships of orphans.[24]

Public scrutiny of the plans for the Hall generated considerable criticism. Excluded from the official planning process, academics and civic groups challenged the Hall's construction on several fronts. In the courts and in the media, scholars and political activists attacked both the process that had produced the plans for the Hall, and the plans themselves. Arguing that the collusion between the Ministry of Health and Welfare and the Izokukai was unacceptable, they demanded at the very least a more transparent planning and approval policy. The Ministry's offer to allow the Izokukai to administer the ostensibly public facility once construction was complete was especially upsetting. Moreover, the complainants charged, in presenting such a narrow and one-sided perspective on the war experience, that the Hall would diminish Japan's relations with its neighbors, distort history, and abandon an opportunity to promote a careful reflection on the past.

In the Chiyoda ward neighborhoods close to the proposed site itself, opposition focused on more concrete matters. Residents had not been consulted about the construction of the new facility, though it was clear that the Ministry had been required by law to do so. It was also clear that local residents had legitimate complaints, which the Ministry's half-hearted efforts to hold public consultations could not fully address. By the time local residents did get a chance to voice their opposition, the location for the site (on land previously loaned to the Izokukai by the government) had already been determined, as had a design for the museum itself. Under those circumstances, local complaints that the new facility would have a negative impact on the quality of life in the neighborhood, and that its construction would rob the area of safe, open space to which residents could flee during natural disasters, were very difficult to accommodate. As a further sign of the state's perfidy in its handling of the Hall's construction, the Hall's future neighbors would eventually point to revelations that the Ministry of Health

23. Tanaka Nobumasa, "Keishô sarenai rekishi," 13, 22. And is far lower than the ten million estimated casualties in China, the four million in Indonesia, and so on. See John W. Dower, *War Without Mercy: Race and Power in the Pacific War* (New York: Pantheon Books, 1986), 296–97 for casualty estimates.

24. Hammond, "Commemoration Controversies," 104.

and Welfare had used methods that were dubious at best to evade land-use restrictions on the site.[25]

The large number of protest meetings and lawsuits directed against the facility's avowed goals, content, and location seem to have taken the museum's supporters by surprise. Internal conflict added to their problems. Press accounts of post-1992 planning committee meetings almost invariably announced the resignation in protest of at least one prominent member. As they left, many publicly voiced doubts about the museum's purpose and content, noting that their repeated complaints about the course of planning had gone unanswered by Ministry bureaucrats.[26] Izokukai officials had hoped to begin construction in time to have the museum open to the public on the fiftieth anniversary of the war's end. The "Peace Memorial Hall" was thus almost four years behind schedule when it welcomed its first visitors in 1999.

The delays, however, gave the Prime Minister's Office and the Ministry of Health and Welfare time for a series of politically expedient modifications to their plans for the Hall. Prime Minister Murayama Tomiichi's cabinet announced in 1995 that it would support the creation of a separate facility for the study and preservation of materials relating to modern Japan's relationship with Asia. The Japan Center for Asian Historical Records (Ajia Rekishi Shiryô Sentaa) was clearly intended to engage topics and experiences the Peace Memorial Hall would happily elide. Government planners proposed assembling and making accessible to the public documents of all sorts, including film, photographs, trial records, and individual accounts, covering the period from the late nineteenth through the first half of the twentieth centuries.[27] There would be no restrictions on the origin of the source materials, so it was certain that the Center would encompass more than just Japan's experiences. The perspectives of Asians, including Japan's colonial and wartime subjects, would have a prominent place in the Center's collections and research agenda. Perhaps just as significantly, the government moved quickly to involve scholars and other specialists in fleshing out the plans for the Center. The Center's apparent inclusiveness stood in marked contrast to the exclusionary tactics of the Peace Memorial Hall.[28] Although the details of when and where the Center would open still hadn't

25. Hammond, "Commemoration Controversies," 122; "Heiwa Kinenkan de Kôseishô—Kankyôchô ga 'mitsuyaku,'" *Asahi shinbun*, 13 March 1996; "'Heiwa Kinenkan' no kenchiku kyoka," *Sankei shinbun*, 2 June 1996.

26. See, for example, "Heiwa Kinenkan tenji ni fuman," *Sankei shinbun*, 29 September 1994; "Yureru 'Senbotsusha tsuitô heiwa kinenkan'"; "Kinenkan kensetsu dainikai shimon makase," *Sankei shinbun*, 17 November 1994; "Senbotsusha Tsuitô Heiwa Kinenkan meishô o 'Iji Kinenkan' ni," *Sankei shinbun*, 24 January 1995, and "Aitsugu iin no kôgi jinin—'Senbotsusha Tsuitô Heiwa Kinenkan' keikaku minaoshi hisshi," *Mainichi shinbun*, 24 January 1995.

27. The facility has also been referred to as a "Center for Materials on Asian History." "Ajia Rekishi Shiryô Sentaa," *Yomiuri shinbun*, 22 November 1999; "Asia archive with LDP spin in works," *Japan Times*, 20 December 1999.

28. See Kubo Tôru, "Ajia Rekishi Shiryô Sentaa—setsuritsu mondai ni tsuite," *Rekishigaku kenkyû* (November, 1995): 55–9.

been worked out many months after the initial flurry of official activity, the response of the academic community was in those early stages positive, even cautiously optimistic. The possibilities of the newly proposed Center for a time overshadowed the obvious limitations of the Peace Memorial Hall.

The Ministry of Health and Welfare also moved to address some of the criticisms directed against it and its plans for the Hall. Spokesmen for the Ministry announced several changes to the Hall's design and content in September 1995. These changes scaled down the original design, softened its exterior presentation, and reduced the number of exhibition floors to two.[29] In so doing, planners also made significant modifications to the Hall's content. Earlier versions of the exhibition space had included displays dealing with the military and with developments in Asia under Japanese control. Though not by any means central to the museum's narrative, they had at least been present and would have been one element in the museum visitor's experience. The 1995 round of revisions eliminated those displays entirely, and drew the boundaries of the narrative that much more tightly around the suffering and sacrifice of Japan's civilians.

With the Hall's focus thus back on the bereaved and the orphaned, the Izokukai could claim at least a partial victory. One of its original goals, after all, had been to provide a public space to honor precisely those individuals, and pass on to future generations a reminder of what they had done for the nation. Even if omitting the military from that discussion wasn't something the Izokukai would have endorsed given the choice, Ministry planners were understandably anxious to put the controversial project behind them. They appeared willing to give up the military, give up Asia, and essentially abandon any attempt to contextualize the war experiences the museum would describe, if it meant that the project could proceed.

Ministry meetings with residents of the Chiyoda ward neighborhoods near the museum site achieved similar results. These sessions gave the Hall's future neighbors a chance to voice their grievances even as they fulfilled the Ministry's obligations to inform and consult the community. In reducing the height and altering the design of the facility, Ministry officials appeared willing to accommodate at least some of the local concerns. The Ministry's subsequent statement in October 1996 that it had obtained the understanding of the majority of the residents of the local neighborhood thus came as no surprise. Though vocal opposition remained, and legal

29. The earliest plans for the Hall had called for a fourteen-story structure. Later changes reduced it to ten, and finally to only seven. The modification to the original design may also reflect some problems the architect, Kikutake Kiyonori, was having with it. In October 1994, after coming across a description of Kikutake's proposed design for the War Dead Peace Memorial Hall in the newspaper, a Saitama real estate developer accused Kikutake's firm of having already sold an identical design to him. The developer argued that his "Healthy House Kumatani," a residence for the elderly, was essentially the same structure as the one Kikutake was planning to build as the Peace Memorial Hall, and sought compensation from the architectural firm and from the Ministry of Health and Welfare. "Saitama no rôjin homu to Senbotsusha Tsuitô Heiwa Kinenkan," *Sankei shinbun*, 13 October 1994. The cost of the re-design is thought to have been substantial.

challenges to the museum continued to be mounted, work on the facility began soon after the Ministry's October 1996 announcement.[30]

Construction took two years. Shortly before the finishing touches were complete, Ministry of Health and Welfare officials announced that the new facility would be called the Shôwa-kan, or Shôwa Hall.[31] They offered no single justification for this final change to the museum's name, pointing out only that "the Shôwa era's most significant event was the great war," and that the name Shôwa Hall thus "evokes the effort of those who suffered because of that war," and establishes their "hard work as the foundation of the prosperity that followed."[32] The bureaucratic process that produced the new name certainly merits additional study if and when participants in it share their memories or their records—the planners' intentions are at one level puzzling, in that for most younger Japanese mention of the Shôwa era is far more likely to evoke images of affluence than of war and devastation.[33] At the same time, however, the "Shôwa" label brings with it many other possible associations. A reference to the emperor is of course implicit in the selection of an era-name to describe the facility—the museum's proximity to the Imperial Palace makes the connection even harder to overlook. Significant too is the fact that calling the museum the "Shôwa Hall" complicates from the start comparisons with other, possibly similar facilities. By not mentioning as part of the facility's name the war, the war dead, memorialization, or the particular historical moment the museum seeks to narrate and appropriating instead an entire era-name as its official label, the Ministry has wrapped the facility in innocuous language, as smooth as the rounded surfaces of the structure itself.[34]

Finally, the new name confirms the facility's exclusion of the experiences of non-Japanese. It certainly wouldn't be hard to argue that Japan alone experienced a Shôwa era; even Japan's colonies were freed from that particular chronological constraint in 1945. Both the museum's subject matter and the very way in which time is measured are thus carefully bounded.

In his brief appearance at the museum's opening ceremony in March 1999, Prime Minister Obuchi Keizô referred to the important role the Shôwa Hall would play in passing on "the experiences and reality" of the wartime and postwar eras to generations to come, and of his hopes for the Hall's contributions to the twenty-first century.[35] The sections that follow reflect on what the

30. "'Senbotsusha Tsuitô Heiwa Kinenkan' no hontai kôji hajimaru," *Mainichi shinbun*, 29 October 1996; and "Chiyodakumin kara kôji chûshi motome teiso—Kudan ni kensetsuchû no Senbotsusha Tsuitô Kinenkan," *Mainichi shinbun*, 13 August 1996. The court cases were still wending their way through the system in early 2001. See, for example, "'Shôwa-kan' soshô seikyû shirizokeru hanketsu," *Mainichi shinbun*, 9 March 2001.

31. "Seishikimei 'Shôwa-kan,'" *Asahi shinbun*, 16 December 1998.

32. "Seishikimei 'Shôwa-kan.'"

33. Dower, "An Aptitude for Being Unloved," 234.

34. See Gluck, "The Past in the Present," for an insightful discussion of the Shôwa era and modern memory.

35. "Jidai no yôsei ni sô," *Yomiuri shinbun*, 28 March 1999.

museum's curators have chosen to reveal as "experiences and reality," and how the museum conveys a narrative, of sorts, to its audience.

Structure, Content, and Presentation

The building is at once hard to miss and unobtrusive. Located on Yasukuni-dori just in front of the Kudan Kaikan and right behind the corner police box, the seven-story, windowless, elliptical structure is all curves and textured metallic surfaces. Architect Kikutake Kiyonori's design is meant to strike a balance between a demonstration of strength and some measure of integration with the surrounding environment.[36] The titanium panels that completely cover the exterior help sustain both effects, sealing off the interior from any direct contact with the elements and thus protecting the materials housed inside, while lending a subdued, somber tone to the entire structure. Where the earlier version of the architect's plans had called for the building to evoke the image of a person at prayer, and thus struck many observers as sharply at odds with the local needs, the Shôwa Hall as built presents instead a flowing, almost aerodynamic shape. As part of its eco-friendly design, the structure's exterior surfaces are supposed to be maintenance free, and thus serve as a "prototype of permanent architecture for later generations."[37] Kikutake's hope is that the Hall will evoke "images of the preciousness of life" and "messages of the search for peace" in those who encounter it. Though less visually striking than the Edo-Tokyo Museum, another of Kikutake's recent efforts, the Shôwa Hall's silver-gray façade is certainly distinctive.

At the same time, the Hall tries hard to blend in. It occupies a small site. At slightly more than 2,100 square meters, the facility's impact at street level is minimized.[38] A few carefully placed banners and signs at ground level identify the building for visitors. Depending on how one approaches the building, however, it is possible to walk up the stairs to the "second-story" plaza and down the other side without ever encountering a description of what the Shôwa Hall houses, or instructions on how to get in. The public, open space in the plaza up the stairs from Yasukuni-dori presents multiple points of view onto the surrounding neighborhood. One aspect looks out over the moat towards the Budôkan, another perspective looks down the street in the direction of Yasukuni Shrine. There are a few benches, and an interesting interweaving of concrete and wood; an Escher-like portrayal of clasping hands of different colors winds its way across the stone-floor.[39]

36. Matsusato Ikuo, "Shōwa-kan," *Shinkenchiku* 74 (May, 1999): 166.

37. Matsusato Ikuo, "Shōwa-kan," 166.

38. Another way of considering the size of the Hall's site is this: more than ninety would have fit within the grounds of the Peace Prayer Comprehensive Center proposed in 1984. The grounds of the Edo-Tokyo Museum could hold more than a dozen Shôwa Halls.

39. The open plaza exists in part to provide an evacuation site for neighborhood residents. As noted earlier, local citizens had opposed construction of the facility in part because it threatened to eliminate the existing evacuation site.

Visitors to the Hall receive an introductory brochure upon arrival, which provides a useful but dry account of the Hall's exhibits and resources, and defines the facility's goals as "the collection, preservation and exhibition of materials and information relating to the hardships of the lives of citizens as experienced during and after the war (from roughly 1935 to 1955), by the children and families of those lost in the war, and to provide opportunities for later generations to come to learn about these hardships."[40] The museum's coverage is thus not a retrospective of the entire Shôwa era, but of only about a third of it. The exhibits are true to their time frame, and include only a few items from before 1937 and only a handful from after 1955. As the brochure suggests, the perspective the facility takes on those twenty years, and the questions it asks about them are just as carefully constrained.

Much more interesting than the standard brochure is the pamphlet directed at children; "Naze? Nani! Shôwa-kan" (roughly—Why? What! The Shôwa Hall) provides an interrogative and playful introduction to the exhibits, and more specifically to the material culture of the wartime and early postwar eras.[41] With a kindly-looking grandfather as the imaginary tour guide and quiz master, the pamphlet helps school children negotiate the museum as a series of encounters with the artifacts of everyday life. "At the Shôwa Hall," reads the pamphlet's cover, "you can see the materials and artifacts that reveal the lives of the citizens at the time when your grandpa and grandma were children." On the same page a cartoon drawing of the grandfather poses next to a large wooden cabinet, and asks, "There is one of these in every home nowadays. At the time no electricity was used, and ice was put inside. What is this?" Before turning the page and encountering the answer (a refrigerator), readers are reminded that "once you see the era's household appliances, you'll also see how hard life was."[42] The rest of the pamphlet, and indeed the exhibits themselves, sustain this focus on daily life, the hardships and sacrifice of the 1930s and 1940s, and connections to the present day.[43]

The top two of the seven stories house exhibition space; more on those in a moment. The fifth floor is home to a multi-media information center, one that is supposed to help researchers or casual users encounter visual and other recorded media; still photos, video, oral histories and the like are all

40. The Hall has begun making an English-language brochure available to visitors, but all captions and explanatory materials in the Hall itself were available only in Japanese as of spring 2002. The Hall's web site (*www.Showakan.go.jp*) provides an overview of the museum and its exhibits, though it too is monolingual.

41. Shôwa-kan, *Naze? Nani! Shôwa-kan: Jôsetsu chinretsushitsu kengaku gaido* (Tokyo: Shôwa-kan, 2000).

42. Shôwa-kan, *Naze? Nani! Shôwakan*, 1.

43. Note the choice of an elderly guide for the children's pamphlet, with the caveat that grandma and grandpa were of course children as the experiences described in the Hall unfolded. One effect of this distinction would presumably be to deter questions about what adults were up to back then.

accessible in one form or another. Computer stations make locating the materials relatively straightforward, and in some instances the materials can also be accessed directly from the workstation. The fourth floor houses a library, focused like the Hall on the period 1935–1955; it claims holdings of 70,000 items. The third floor provides research and conference space. The first floor is the entrance and lobby; here visitors are asked first to watch a short video describing the Shôwa-kan's layout and offering a brief sketch of its exhibits before taking the elevator to the seventh floor to begin their tour.

The two exhibition floors are laid out in similar ways; visitors move from one end of the gallery to the next in what amounts to a rough chronological progression. The seventh floor covers 1935–August 1945, the sixth floor August 1945–1955. Each floor is divided into four "corners," or thematically arranged display areas (see Table). At the entrance to the seventh floor gallery visitors first encounter a collection of letters from soldiers to their families and displays of *senninbari* (thousand stitch belts, given to soldiers for good luck and as reminders of home). These appear to be the only artifacts that directly connect the exhibits to developments outside of Japan, or to the Japanese military. The remainder of the Hall is silent on both topics, and even here at the beginning the connections are tenuous. The belts are displayed in ways that avoid any depiction of soldiers, their uniforms (although mannequins are frequently used elsewhere in the museum to illustrate civilian garb), or explanations of from whom or what the wearers of the *senninbari* needed to be protected.[44] An emphasis on brevity and simple description is mirrored in the captions associated with the exhibits as well. These short texts describe but offer no analysis.

Two wall-size photographs frame either end of the gallery; the first and closest to the entrance is of exuberant crowds seeing soldiers off (but to where?) at a train station; at the opposite end is a landscape of what remained of a part of a Shibuya neighborhood in May 1945; interspersed within that larger photo are many smaller ones of people listening to the emperor's broadcast announcing the end of the war. In between these two end pieces the gallery presents a wide array of artifacts, with an emphasis on household items: rationing cards, clothing, appliances, food and cooking utensils, textbooks, and so on. Four or five video stations accompany the static displays. Each plays a series of what appears to be old newsreel footage depicting various developments in wartime society; the first station featured films on national schools and early efforts at mobilization; later stations described steps to increase food production, preparations for air raids and

44. Media accounts of the Hall's exhibits almost invariably comment on the presence of the *senninbari*; they attract far more attention than any other single display. Note too that the Shôwa Hall's curatorial policy allows the facility to accept items associated with those killed during the war. Curators, however, have reportedly chosen not to place on display any item directly connected with individuals killed in the war. "Shôwa-kan Ide Magorokusan to iku," *Asahi shinbun*, 9 April 1999, "Rôku tsutaeru 'Senninbari' Tôsho no keisei de Shôwa-kan e," *Yomiuri shinbun*, 6 August 1999, and "'21 seiki ni kataritsugu mono' sensô to kazoku/7," *Mainichi shinbun*, 7 August 1999.

Table 1: Gallery Divisions and Sample Displays

"Corners" and their Subdivisions	Sample Display Contents
Life in a Typical Home a. The living room—a space for mother and children b. The kitchen (mother's space)	Radio, coffee grinder, children's picture books, an ice box, record player, cooking utensils
Life During Rationing a. The food situation b. Material shortages—rationing c. Metal drives—substitute items	Bamboo helmet, porcelain iron, porcelain knife and fork, rationing coupons, bamboo rucksack, and megaphone
Life as a Student During Wartime	School texts, a child's lunchbox, school uniform, machinery, and tools from factories at which children worked
Life During the Air Raids a. Preparing for the air raids b. Air defense activities c. Air defense units	Gas mask and eye protection, air raid siren, blackout bulb, instructions for dealing with incendiary devices, fire extinguishers
Barracks Life – The Black Market	Lucky Strike and Camel cigarette packages; wrappers from Hershey's chocolate bars; pots and pans and clothing refashioned from surplus military items
Children's Lives a. Orphans of war b. Changes in education c. Play	Student's desk, children's picture books; school texts with passages blacked out, board games, wrapper from a package of Wrigley's chewing gum, marbles
Mothers in the Postwar a. Working mothers and raising children b. Helping out with family finances and moving ahead in school c. Hard times finding work	Sewing machine, baby's rattle, scissors. Copy of the *Yomiuri shinbun*, graduation diploma
Toward Recovery	Radio, toy car (stamped "Made in Occupied Japan"); Electric heater, movie posters (*Mrs. Miniver, Unconquered, The Bicycle Thief*), camera

eventually the evacuation of children into the countryside. These films and indeed the exhibits pay particular attention to the role of women and children as mobilized citizens; their participation in the war effort is clearly depicted. The costs in terms of hardship and dislocation are also portrayed, although the exhibits do not reveal much directly about the effects of Allied bombing. The Hall is not focused on events (the surrender is one of the few referred to directly in the exhibits) so much as on processes. Mobilization and recovery unfold over time without being anchored to particular dates or developments—they just happen.

The perimeter of the gallery is lined with posters from the war era, mostly ministerial exhortations to live frugally and promote national health, and racks of popular magazines from the 30s and 40s. Similar posters appear in the next, postsurrender gallery. Although the illustrations and in some instances the ministries have changed, citizens in the postwar were still being told by the state to save their money and live healthier lives.

At the bottom of the stairs down to the sixth floor is another large photo, this one of trains bearing people into the countryside to trade valuables for food shortly after the end of the war. The rest of the gallery continues the earlier emphasis on the lives of women and children, and includes features on the changing roles of mothers, the rise of postwar popular culture, radio and television, and of course the gradual return of prosperity in the form of better household appliances, nicer clothing, and healthier living conditions. The presence of Occupation forces is alluded to, but the Occupiers themselves are largely absent from the photos and videos used on this floor.

Two final sites mark the end of the exhibits; the first is a small area with benches and a wide-screen monitor, which cycles through videos of interviews/monologues with people remembering their wartime and post-surrender experiences. The content of these dialogs is linked to earlier themes and experiences described in the galleries. The second concluding site in some ways mirrors the one directly above it on the seventh floor (which featured letters from soldiers and *senninbari*); visitors are flanked on one side by a series of (present-day) photos of smiling, elderly citizens and on the other by replicas of what might be thought of as symbols of Japan's postwar recovery. Swimmer Furuhashi Hironoshin's 1949 world record, and Yukawa Hideki's Nobel Prize in Physics of the same year are among the items marking Japan's return to the world stage.

The Shôwa Hall: History and Memory

The Hall's own history can at times seem more complicated and contentious than the narratives it presents, which are surprisingly unprovocative. There is something to the thought that the Hall's subject matter and the items appearing in its displays are simply what were left once the potentially

controversial content was excised. Knowing that early plans for the facility, when it was still referred to as a War Dead Peace Memorial Hall, included depictions of the military and of Japan's other presences in Asia, alongside memorials to fallen soldiers, and within sight of long lists of the names of the (Japanese) war dead, that the Shôwa Hall as it came to be built contained no such imagery requires some explanation. It can be hard not to imagine a gradual winnowing out process in which first the rest of Asia, then the military, and finally the war dead themselves were set aside. In a facility devoted to a retelling of the history of the 1930s, 40s, and 50s, these are significant sacrifices, arguably leaving for curators only the relatively unburdened images of life at home with which to work.

Observers have focused on the absence of the military and Asia from the Hall's exhibits as part of a broader critique of the facility's failure to engage, one way or another, questions about the war's causes, the conflict's legacies, and Japan's conduct. As one visitor, novelist Ide Magoroku, pointed out, "Even though there were things that I was nostalgic about, there was nothing at the core of the exhibit. I suppose you couldn't avoid learning something about the war from the information presented, but in deleting references to the causes and particulars of the war, there is no meaning in thinking only about the hardship of the people."[45] Critics on the right have been unkind as well. Writer Kamisaka Fuyuko, a member of one of the planning committees appointed by the Ministry of Health and Welfare to design the Peace Memorial Hall, voiced what are no doubt common complaints:

> Shôwa-kan? What does that mean, really? "Shôwa" and "war" have come to stand for almost the same thing. And yet if Japan's military, which established the context for the hard work and sacrifice of Japan's citizens, isn't somehow represented, what is there that can be said about "Shôwa"? You can't just leave out the single most significant event. What's the point of having just pots and pans? These aren't exhibits about the Stone Age, after all. After twenty years and a tremendous amount of money, after such big talk about war orphans and praying for peace, in the end the impression you're left with is one of running away, of the absence of any logical connection to the era. It is a symbol of an apologetic Japan with no will of its own.[46]

The Hall's silences loom large. Unlike the neighboring Yûshûkan, for example, the Hall does not directly confront visitors with the images, artifacts, or even the names of those lost in the war. The Yûshûkan's exhibit halls are filled with the final letters, battle-tattered clothing, and photographs of those killed, while in the main hall restored aircraft, armaments, and dioramas of past battles offer other evidence of the

45. "Shôwa-kan Ide Magorokusan to iku."
46. "Seishikimei 'Shôwa-kan,'" Kamisaka resigned from the committee in 1995.

war's ferocity.[47] The military, the state, and violent death are common elements in the Yûshûkan's approach to the war years, and are altogether absent in the Shôwa Hall's narrative of the same era.

Asia's absence is similarly remarkable. The Hall's narrative boundaries are carefully drawn at the perimeter of the "homeland," thus shutting the door on any discussion of the actions of Japan's military, the conduct of the war itself, or the suffering of anyone other than Japanese, in Japan. In practical terms this means that what you might think would be major topics in even a "domestic" history of the 1930s and 1940s go undiscussed. Life in the colonies, Manchuria's popular appeal, and even emigration are elided in the exhibits.[48] So too is any mention that Koreans, Chinese, and other non-Japanese Asians were present in Japan as laborers, conscripted workers, or students. This double omission, of the colonies and colonizers abroad, and the colonial subjects at home, is in some ways a familiar one. As Lisa Yoneyama points out in her examination of Hiroshima's place in the construction of postwar memory, "Political exigencies in postimperial Japan rendered the nation's multiethnic, multiracial, and multicultural constituencies invisible and produced a forgetting of Japan's relationship to its former colonies, along with its promises and the agonies it had inflicted upon them."[49] The Shôwa Hall repeats this forgetting.

At one point observers suggested that the Hall's silences on the colonies and the military's conduct abroad would ultimately be balanced by the Japan Center for Asian Historical Records (Ajia Rekishi Shiryô Sentaa). Such a development is now highly unlikely. Although the Center in fact opened in late 2001, it bears only a superficial resemblance to the facility as originally outlined in 1995. The Liberal Democratic Party's return to power under Hashimoto Ryûtarô in early 1996 slowed planning for the Center to a crawl, and eventually stripped the facility of most of the features that had made it

47. Although the Yûshûkan takes as its subject all of modern Japan's military conflicts, the focus is clearly on the events of the 1930s and 1940s. Seven of the Yûshûkan's fourteen exhibit rooms, and almost the entire main exhibit hall, focus on that period. A sign near the entrance reinforces and perhaps explains this emphasis, noting that of the 2,466,332 spirits enshrined at Yasukuni, 2,133,752 were casualties of the "Greater East Asia War." Renovations completed in July 2002, after my most recent visit to the facility, doubled the Yûshûkan's exhibition space (and added both a cafeteria and museum shop). The Yasukuni Shrine's English-language web site (*http://www.yasukuni.or.jp/english/index.html*) includes information on the museum.

48. In 1930, more than 1.5 million Japanese resided overseas; at the end of the Second World War more than 3 million civilians awaited repatriation. Louise Young, *Japan's Total Empire: Manchuria and the Culture of Wartime Imperialism* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1998), 315; Orr, *The Victim as Hero*, 156. The return to Japan as late as 1972 of soldiers and other "stragglers" long thought lost had a profound effect on popular thinking about the war, and the nation's postwar course. See Beatrice Trefalt, "Unexpected Returns: Stragglers of the Imperial Army and Memories of the Second World War, 1950–1975" (Ph.D. diss., Murdoch University, 2002) and Yoshikuni Igarashi, "Yokoi Shôichi: When a Soldier Finally Returns Home," in Anne Walthall (Ed.), *The Human Tradition in Modern Japan* (Wilmington, Del.: SR Books, 2002), 197–212.

49. Lisa Yoneyama, *Hiroshima Traces: Time, Space, and the Dialectics of Memory* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1999), 4.

attractive in the first place.[50] The center's original charge had been the collection of materials throughout Asia dealing with Japan's relations with its neighbors in the modern period, and the promotion of scholarship centered on those materials. Announcements by the government in 1999 made it clear that the Center would operate not as an independent entity but as an addition to Japan's National Archives. Moreover, the Cabinet stipulated that no attempt would be made to collect documents or other source materials held outside of Japan. The government instead proposed that the Center's focus be on the development of digitized versions of materials already in Japan's National Archives, the Foreign Ministry archives, and a few other ministerial collections, arguing that it would be too difficult to guarantee the veracity of documents held anywhere else.[51] The Center in other words would take documents already open (at least in theory) to the public and make them available in a different, potentially more accessible format. As redefined by the Liberal Democratic Party, the Center could neither add to what was already part of the public record, nor offer an analytical framework with which to approach what it did possess.

The Center finally went online late in 2001, and with one exception adheres to the guidelines announced in 1999.[52] Documents currently available for viewing and download include holdings from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, some Imperial Army and Navy records, and Meiji-era Cabinet documents. At one point it had been announced that the Center would deal only with documents from the period 1926–1945, but that restriction has been set aside in favor of a much earlier, late nineteenth-century starting date. Although the Center can presumably add materials later, in its current configuration it is in no way positioned to fill the gaps in the Shôwa Hall's narrative.

The long list of what was left out of the Shôwa Hall's exhibits seems to testify to how much of the wartime past remains problematic and contested. The ongoing debates over textbook revision, reparations for former comfort women and others who suffered at the hands of the Japanese military, and of course the challenges to "masochistic" history posed by groups like the Society for the Making of New School Textbooks in History are serious issues, ones with which the public and diplomats alike struggle on a regular basis. At the same time, however, that very regularity, the predictable nature of off-limits topics, raises some interesting questions about how to assess the Shôwa Hall. As the critical observations above suggest, defining the Hall's

50. "Ôhaba shukushô, 2001 nen kaiketsu e 'Ajia Rekishi Shiryô Sentaa'," *Asahi shinbun*, 27 November 1999, "Ajia Rekishi Sentaa 13 nen kaiketsu o kakugi kettei," *Sankei shinbun*, 30 November 1999, "'Ajia Rekishi Shiryô Sentaa' no 2001 nendo kaiketsu o kettei," *Mainichi shinbun*, 1 December 1999.

51. "Ajia rekishi shiryô senta."

52. The Center defines its mission as follows: "The JACAR is established for the purpose of providing through the Internet the index and the digital image information of historical records about modern Japan-Asia relations held and made available to the public by Japanese national institutions." See *http://www.jacar.go.jp/f_e.htm*, accessed 29 March 2002.

narrative as a series of absences, as a failure to confront "what happened," is a common critique. By not dealing with the military, the emperor, Asia, and atrocities—the list could go on—the Hall seems to acknowledge the complaints of its critics, and to have avoided offering any argument at all.[53] Such scenarios in the management of public history are almost familiar by now—the Smithsonian's Enola Gay exhibit certainly stands out as a readily identifiable example of a controversial exhibit stripped of any significant content. It would not be hard to conclude that what happened to the Shôwa Hall was a similar process, one in which the museum's narrative content was reduced to some lowest common denominator. Such an argument allows an interpretation of the museum that acknowledges it as deeply flawed, yet ultimately writes the site off as rhetorically empty. Stripped of the military, of Asia, and the dead, what remains? What, indeed, is the point of having "just pots and pans?"

By focusing on the home front, and on particular aspects of life in Japan during years of crisis, the Hall is in fact doing much more than avoiding controversial topics—it is constructing a subtle but powerful interpretation of the era's meaning. While acknowledging that the gaps in the Hall's historical narrative are real, it is at least as important to look carefully at how the Hall's curators go about developing a meaningful narrative despite those gaps, and wonder how that alternative narrative might frame the era for contemporary visitors. If the military, Asia, and the dead are left out, who or what gets "left in," and why? What do these choices imply for how visitors are encouraged to reflect on the past, and use it to inform the present?

The physical layout of the facility, for example, offers some insight into a key chronological feature of the "Shôwa experience." The disjuncture between the seventh and sixth floors is abrupt and at first glance complete, severing history before August 15, 1945 from all that happens afterward. A visitor could not at any point look back from an Occupation-era exhibit to one depicting the war years. The physical arrangement of the Hall prevents the possibility of even an accidental conflation of the two periods. At the same time, though, there are continuities inherent in the Hall's thematic arrangements, even if they aren't immediately obvious. The hardship and suffering depicted as features of the war years have a great deal in common with the destitution and want associated with the Occupation era. Hunger, homelessness, and deprivation look the same in early 1945 and early 1946. The only difference the Hall acknowledges is that Occupation-era suffering eventually went away and was replaced by better standards of living. There is little reason to conclude on the basis of the exhibits and the captions accompanying them, in fact, that in the realm of daily life the end of the war

53. Indeed, according to one newspaper account, "After lengthy public debate over the hall's exhibits and Japan's war responsibility, the government declared it has given up the idea of showing an interpretation of history, including how the wars came about and how the government now views them." Reiji Yoshida, "New War Hall Said to Sidestep Nation's Guilt," *Japan Times*, 26 March 1999.

brought any fundamental transformation to anything other than material culture. There is little or no mention of the political transformation or sweeping reforms that characterized the immediate postwar years. The return to prosperity the Hall documents is described in terms of access to better appliances, more toys, and television. These material changes, one could conclude, are the result of unrelenting hard work, sacrifice, and frugality, all of which had their start well before the war ended. Even as the Hall insists on a temporal rupture between pre- and postsurrender Japan, in other words, it also allows for important continuities. For those younger visitors who might associate the Shôwa era only with the affluence of its last few decades, the Hall binds the wealth and power of the 1980s and early 1990s to what their parents and grandparents endured in the 1930s, 40s, and 50s.

These continuities are significant on another level as well. Recent works on "victim consciousness" and popular narratives of the experiences of wartime have helped explore how ideas about citizenship and trauma have evolved alongside changing ideologies of victimhood, defeat, and loss in postwar Japan.[54] Though the answers have not been at all constant across the postwar era, questions of agency and victimhood are clearly central to efforts to construct a public narrative of the war years. School textbooks have been one forum for these interrogations of the past, as have works of fiction, film, and state policies toward those injured by the war. The processes through which first the military and eventually simply "war" itself are assigned responsibility for the conflict and its effects, and through which Japanese victimhood takes on political and cultural meaning, are complicated and dynamic, linked to the fortunes of the major political parties, changes in the state's policies toward textbook production, and to Japan's international circumstances. As James Orr points out, however, the period from 1955 to 1965, which corresponded roughly with the emergence of the Liberal Democratic Party as the nation's most powerful political entity and the beginnings of Japan's era of high-speed economic growth, saw the construction of something like a dominant ideology of victimhood.[55] The initial features of this "victim consciousness" included a sharply drawn distinction between "the people" and the military. The latter is described as having deceived the citizenry, as having coerced and tricked them into support for the war, so that the responsibility for all aspects of the war is firmly fixed with Japan's military. Over time, as Orr and others have argued, questions about the specific mechanics of the war's origins and conduct gave way to a more diffuse concern with the war's effects. War itself, and not any particular set of individuals, became the central agent of the people's suffering. This iteration of "victim consciousness" casts war as a sort of natural disaster, one whose causes are abstract and distant, but whose effects were real and unavoidable.

54. Orr, *The Victim as Hero*.
55. Orr, *The Victim as Hero*, 89–97.

Such an approach to the war's causes and course has any number of implications for how an average person might reflect on the war and its meaning. It encourages thoughtful observers, for example, to recognize the suffering of non-Japanese as having essentially the same causes (the military/the war) and qualities as the suffering endured by at least some Japanese. In other words, a "victim consciousness" can stress the commonalities between suffering at home at the hands of the Japanese military and the war, and suffering by other Asians, abroad, also at the hands of the Japanese military and the war. So long as the distinction between the duped Japanese citizenry as victims and the Japanese military as perpetrators could be maintained, textbooks and other media were well positioned to point out how suffering and victimization represented a shared wartime experience across Asia.[56]

An equally important component of the "victim consciousness" that took shape in the late 1950s and early 1960s has to do with the (re)definitions of citizenship. The conservative Liberal Democratic Party leadership, eager to promote patriotism and encourage devotion to the nation, knew that such traits were still very much associated in the public mind with the war years, and the military's cynical use of the citizenry. Textbook handling of the war years shifted subtly by the late 1950s, in part to accommodate the Liberal Democratic Party, by suggesting that both citizens and the government had been victims of the military.[57] By locating responsibility for the war not with the state more broadly but only in the hands of the military, this new and highly imaginative construction of how the war came about seemed to clear the way for a renewed enthusiasm for struggle and sacrifice on behalf of the nation. At the same time, assertions of victimhood began to include a hint that past suffering wasn't altogether meaningless. Orr writes of elementary school texts of the 1960s:

> The people are described as having worked for national strength and success in an era in which imperialist expansion was the norm; when the militarists' influence over government increased during the Pacific War, the people continued to sacrifice for the country as they never learned the truth about the fighting and their freedom of speech had been taken away.[58]

Key elements in this emergent set of beliefs, including the assertions that all Japanese were victims of the war, that their suffering was akin to that experienced elsewhere, and that devotion to the nation was something to be celebrated rather than feared, are clearly visible in the Shôwa Hall. The exhibits argue again and again that postwar prosperity is connected to the hardships experienced by the wartime generation. The exhibits present a

56. Orr, *The Victim as Hero*, 97–101.
57. Orr, *The Victim as Hero*, 94–96.
58. Orr, *The Victim as Hero*, 93.

picture of hard-working, committed, and stoic civilians struggling against and ultimately overcoming terrible obstacles to create modern-day Japan. These achievements are thus linked not to politics or policy, but to the sacrifices of a particular generation of everyday citizens. The result is a narrative that celebrates the bravery and sacrifice of the average citizen while at the same time eliding their powerlessness, as individuals, against the developments that led to war and ultimately to defeat.

The exhibits simultaneously emphasize the shared purpose of the era. The Hall makes it appear as if the citizenry shared these values equally and voluntarily, and as a result paints the whole era in an almost nostalgic light. Although the suffering and to some extent the damage inflicted by the war are alluded to, the videos and other images are more often than not of smiling people happily committed to the tasks ahead of them, be it digging up fallow fields to plant more rice or sending one's child off to the countryside to escape the bombing. One would hardly expect otherwise from contemporary film footage, but here these images are presented not as propaganda but as windows on the past. Given the Hall's emphasis on hardship and sacrifice, the failure to address the darker aspects of mobilization is both troubling and illuminating. Censorship is most prominently represented in the exhibits, for example, in displays featuring the inked-out sections of Occupation-era school textbooks. Pre-surrender controls on publication, speech, and assembly are simply glossed over. It isn't hard to see why this is so. The Shôwa Hall's uncritical presentation of key tenets of victim consciousness as a unifying theme makes it almost impossible to portray subjects/citizens (including agents of the state) as knowingly deceiving, suppressing, or otherwise injuring one's fellow subjects/citizens.

The range of what constitutes commonly shared interpretations of the war in Japan has broadened considerably since the 1960s. The cultural and political implications of victim consciousness, for example, have been the subject of careful, critical challenges, spurred on in part by the same developments that lead to the 1990s boom in the construction of museums of war and peace. Participants' accounts of atrocities by Japan's military, testimony by former comfort women, and at least some recognition of the presence of Chinese and Korean communities in Japan before, during, and after the war have all reshaped how textbooks and many other representations of the past explore and explain the era. The Shôwa Hall, however, offers no evidence of these developments in its interpretive framework, and sticks quite closely to the language and ideas of an era forty years past.[59] The Hall ends up encouraging twenty-first century museum visitors to think

59. Speaking to the press on 14 August 1963 about a scheduled memorial service on the anniversary of the end of the war, Chief Cabinet Secretary Kurogane Yasumi described the service as an indication of "the entire nation's sober desire to offer its sincere tribute to the more than 3 million whose sacrifice had given us today's peace and development (heiwa to hatten)." Orr, *The Victim as Hero*, 139.

about the 1930s and 40s as if it was still the 1960s, and as if the conservative perspective on the past was the only one available.

That these themes of the value of service to the nation, of a common Asian suffering, and of popular passivity enforced by the war itself are subtly rather than blatantly presented owes something to the technology and media of the museum. The video displays, lighting, interactive multi-media, and the like are state of the art, and speak to the professionalism of the curators and exhibit designers. To make one final comparison to the neighboring Yûshûkan, where there is seldom any doubt about the point of view being professed or the arguments informing each display, the Shôwa Hall's messages are not so close to the surface. The displays don't provoke; as they move through the routines of daily life they seem as likely to evoke remembrance as caution. Although I don't suppose that the curators deliberately set out to foster nostalgia for the early Shôwa era, their focus on the experiences of everyday life, absent discussion of major events, figures, or institutions, certainly lends itself to such a response. During one visit to the museum I tagged along through the Hall with a group that included a male in his 30s or 40s, a woman in her mid to late 60s, and her grandson, in his teens.[60] The "son" and grandson moved quickly through the exhibits; the grandmother did not. Her first word as we moved out of the elevator and into the first part of the gallery (featuring the *senninbari*) was a cheerful enough "natsukashii" (roughly, "How this makes me remember!"). She lingered over the rest of the exhibits, and struck up conversations with other visitors about their shared experiences. For her, at least, the visit blended remembrance and recognition with a particular contextualization of how her experiences fit in the longer narrative of modern Japanese history.

The Hall further complicates a critical response to the era (and to the Hall's portrayal of the era) by making the lives of women and children its narrative focus. Three of the eight gallery "corners" are devoted to the experiences of women and children, and much of the content of the other areas touches on aspects of their daily lives as well.[61] Women and children far outnumber men (not just men as soldiers, but men acting in any capacity) in the photographs and other media of the displays. Without ever having to

60. Museum officials reported that they had received more than 66,000 visitors within the first five months of its opening, and that they were therefore projected to meet their attendance goal of 100,000 for the first year. It is less clear what has happened since that report, but anecdotal evidence suggests that the museum has not attracted large numbers of visitors. "'21 seiki ni kataritsugu mono' sensô to kazoku/7." Although certainly a tricky comparison, it is interesting that the Memorial Museum of the Chinese People's War of Resistance to Japan, located outside of Beijing, reportedly attracted seven million visitors between 1987 and 1997. Rana Mitter, "Behind the Scenes at the Museum: Nationalism, History and Memory in the Beijing War of Resistance Museum, 1987-1998," *China Quarterly* (2000): 281.

61. Recent special exhibits mounted at the Hall have maintained this focus. High school baseball during the war years and Occupation, the school lives of children in the 1940s and 1950s, and depictions in image and text of mothers and children during and after the war are among the subjects explored alongside the permanent exhibits.

explain where the men went, the Hall never allows visitors to lose sight of their absence. That husbands and fathers are so often missing in the Hall's postwar narrative helps drive home the point that family tragedies and personal loss extended well beyond the surrender, and that it is in these histories of victimization and loss that the true meaning of the Shôwa era is to be found.

It is striking too that the daily life and everyday experiences of average citizens that make up the narrative in the Hall's displays are entirely commonplace, particular to no one part of the country or class. There is little to mark these lives as in any way unique or distinctive—the radio on display could have belonged to almost anyone; the school textbook at home in any child's rucksack. In addition to reinforcing a conclusion that those who experienced the war years suffered equally and that wartime society was not marked by significant differences, the gap between the viewer and those portrayed in the displays is minimized. The Hall, in other words, uses the commonplace and familiar terrain of the home and neighborhood to break down the barriers between contemporary museum visitors and an imagined social landscape of the war years.[62]

The focus on daily life works for the Hall in at least one other way as well, and that is in its use of contemporary, even progressive methodology, to construct a narrative about the Shôwa era. The museum encourages an interest in what was happening in the day-to-day lives of average citizens, and treats those lives as significant and as worthy of analysis and attention. Such an approach clearly owes something to developments in social history, histories of popular culture and childhood, even gender history, in recent years, and arguably appropriates some of the cachet associated with those methodologies to the Hall. Without over-generalizing too much, it should be safe to say that many scholars working with these methodologies have turned to them as a way of answering questions about the exercise of power and discipline, resistance to the state, and the workings of popular culture and shared ideologies. The Shôwa Hall, it seems to me, in borrowing the

62. The comparisons between the Shôwa Hall's methodology and ones evident in recent exhibitions on the war in Germany are illuminating. Irit Rogoff, writing about the 1987 *Berlin, Berlin* exhibition at the Martin Gropius Bau, observed that "one is surprised by the predominance of images of women and family life, by the degree to which the years of military struggle are represented through images of women engaged in the culture of survival – raising children, queuing for food, sifting through the rubble of bombed buildings." She notes too that "emphasizing the realities of women's lives (*civilian* lives), and focusing on the remains as *debris* rather than *ruins* and on the protagonists as *victims* rather than *vanquished* rewrites the entire relation of the nation to its fascist heritage." Irit Rogoff, "From Ruins to Debris: The Feminization of Fascism in Germany-History Museums," in Daniel J. Sherman and Irit Rogoff (Eds.), *Museum Culture: Histories, Discourses, Spectacles* (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1994), 239, 242, emphasis in original. As Rogoff argues, however, the choices in the German exhibits were explicit, and the process of stripping out masculine artifacts was designed to avoid any possibility of portraying the Nazi regime in a sentimental or nostalgic manner. The Ministry of Health and Welfare has not produced an account of the processes that produced the Shôwa Hall's narrative content, making any comparably informed analysis of curatorial intent almost impossible.

subject matter of these historians and none of the critical apparatus that goes with it, looks much more up-to-date and thoughtful in its handling of the past than it actually is.[63]

James Young refers to the "illusion of common memory" as one of the products of monument building, and it is possible to see in the Shôwa Hall's exhibits the production of just such an illusion.[64] The Hall's presentation of the past as essentially stripped of tension, as lacking in controversy, certainly suggests that all the questions have been answered, the debates defused. Were that really the case, the Hall could well mark a turning point in the construction of a shared, public history of the war years, and we could look forward to thinking about new questions. A more reasonable conclusion, though, would have to acknowledge that the Shôwa Hall signifies something else entirely. Its insistence on answering old, and loaded questions—What was the nature of our suffering? To what do we owe our prosperity? What do good citizens do when asked to sacrifice for the nation?—while pretending not even to have posed them, adds almost nothing to the public's exposure to debates about the meaning and legacy of the war. In that sense there are no new perspectives on the meaning of the war being offered in the Hall, only old ones long past their "use-by" date.

Challenges to the Hall's narrative in contemporary Japan are numerous. They include the growing number of "peace" museums and memorials throughout Japan that have asked visitors to confront not just the nature of wartime suffering, but more complicated questions of responsibility, reparations, and apology, as well.[65] (Though as noted earlier, such sites are more likely to be found away from the capital, home to the Shôwa Hall and the Yûshûkan, than in it.) These facilities differ from the Shôwa Hall in their willingness to embrace complex and even contradictory personal and national histories of the war years. In doing so they are also much better than the Hall at capturing the diverse and thoughtful responses to the war's legacies woven into contemporary scholarship and popular culture alike.

Part of the "illusion of common memory" crafted in the Shôwa Hall, it seems to me, is as much about the 1950s and 1960s as it is about the war years. The stance the Hall takes toward the war is essentially that of a nation just getting over the immediate effects of the conflict, and poised to rebuild. That era of reconstruction, idealized as one of shared purpose and hard-won

63. See also Jordan Sand, "Monumentalizing the Everyday: The Edo-Tokyo Museum," *Critical Asian Studies* 33 (September, 2001): 351–78.

64. Young, *The Texture of Memory*, 6.

65. Other forms would include the large number of books published every year that deal in some way with the histories of the war. Though almost a cliché by now, it is hard to resist the temptation to point out that major bookstores in Japan almost invariably stock shelf after shelf of books on the war. Some of the works on those shelves celebrate Japan's achievements or re-articulate narratives of victimhood, but just as many seek to refute those arguments, or document the suffering inflicted by the Japanese military on civilians throughout Asia. Both sets of narratives (and everything in between) refute the refrain common in Western media accounts and in some scholarship that the war remains undiscussed and forgotten in contemporary Japan, and Japan's role in it somehow glossed over.

gratification, stands in sharp contrast to common views of contemporary Japanese society, in which uncertainty, selfishness, and instability seem ever present. Nostalgia for a time when the war was easier to come to terms with, and the nation's future seemed as bright as its past was bleak, is embedded in the Hall's treatment of the war itself. What we "remember," or imagine we remember, as we pass by the displays of wartime hardship and Occupied Japan is thus doubly transformed, for the Shôwa Hall would have us believe not only the myth of the victimized nation, but in the illusion of resolution that followed.